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Consent to Student Loan Bankruptcy Discharge
JOHN PATRICK HUNT*
As the Department of Education reconsiders its rules governing consent to discharge
of federal student loans in bankruptcy, this Article argues for the first time that the
Department should approach the problem specifically as an operator of programs
to promote education and benefit students, rather than as an entity interested only in
debt collection. This Article shows that the Department’s rules to date have treated
whether to consent to discharge primarily as a pecuniary issue, without regard to
the educational goals of the student loan programs. For example, the Department
apparently has never considered whether making it difficult to discharge student
loans interferes with borrowers’ freedom of career choice or deters students from
pursuing higher education in the first place.
Discharge should be more predictable for borrowers. The Department’s
regulations have given ever more nontransparent discretion to student loan holders
to decide whether to oppose discharge. This Article joins the scholarly call for the
Department to remedy this situation by adopting objectively defined criteria for loan
holders’ consent to discharge. Creating such “safe harbors” for borrowers would
eliminate the uncertainty and formidable procedural barriers that attend seeking
relief through an adversarial process in bankruptcy court. These barriers may deter
as many as 69,000 eligible borrowers a year from seeking to discharge their student
loans in bankruptcy.
This Article argues that furthering the educational purposes of the student loan
programs calls for the Department to consent to discharge more freely. Currently,
the only substantive ground for consent is the presence of “undue hardship,” as that
term from the Bankruptcy Code has been interpreted by courts. But judicial tests for
undue hardship do not take account of discharge-favoring purposes of the student
loan programs. To fulfill its mandate, the Department should consent to discharge
in cases where failure to do so would thwart the purposes of the student loan
programs, even if undue hardship is absent.
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financial support of this work. Thanks to Katherine Florey for helpful comments. Thanks
also to the Mabie Law Library staff.

1138

IN DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 95:1137

CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................... 1139
I. THE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT’S BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE RULES........... 1143
A. Student Loan Bankruptcy Nondischargeability ................................. 1144
B. Overview of Major Federal Student Loan Programs......................... 1145
C. The 2015 Dear Colleague Letter ....................................................... 1147
D. Overview of Discharge Consent Regulation History ......................... 1149
II. “TRANS-SUBSTANTIVE” OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............ 1150
A. On Thoughtful Rules .......................................................................... 1151
1. The Rules Have Been Issued Without Thorough Explanation ... 1151
2. The Department Should Thoughtfully Explain Its Rules............ 1152
B. On Complete, Uniform, and Clear Rules ........................................... 1154
1. The Rules Have Been Incomplete, Nonuniform, and
Ambiguous ................................................................................. 1154
2. The Department Should Consider Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking
to Complete, Make Uniform, and Clarify the Rules ................... 1157
C. On Predictable Rules ......................................................................... 1159
III. “SUBSTANTIVE” OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: LIBERALIZING
DISCHARGE CONSENT POLICY ..................................................................... 1165
A. The Rules Have Treated Consent to Discharge as a Debt Collection
Issue ................................................................................................... 1165
B. The Department Should Advance the Goals of the Student Loan Programs
by Adopting a More Generous Discharge Consent Policy ................ 1166
1. The Department Should Take Account of All Relevant Purposes
of the Student Loan Programs in Setting Discharge Policy ........ 1166
2. By Specifying Judicially Defined “Undue Hardship” as the Only
Substantive Basis for Discharge, the Department Ignores Critical
Purposes of the Loan Programs .................................................. 1170
3. It Is Unclear that the Department Could Expand the Definition
of “Undue Hardship” .................................................................. 1173
4. The Department Should Act to Promote the Programs’ Purposes
by Adopting Additional Bases for Consent to Discharge ........... 1175
C. The Department Has the Authority to Consent to Discharge Even
Where “Undue Hardship” Is Absent ................................................. 1178
1. The Secretary Enjoys Authority to Regulate Loan Programs and
to Release Claims that on Its Face Encompasses the Power to
Consent to Bankruptcy Discharge .............................................. 1179
2. Nothing Limits the Secretary’s Authority to Consent to Situations
Where “Undue Hardship” Is Present .......................................... 1181
3. Other Federal Agencies Have Adopted Nonhardship-Based
Programs for Compromise of Claims ......................................... 1183
4. The Department Can Add Bases for Dischargeability Under the
Ford Program Without Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking ........ 1185
5. The Department Should Consider Adding Grounds for Consent
to Discharge Through Guidance First, Following up with Noticeand-Comment Rulemaking ......................................................... 1188
CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................1190

2020]

S T U DE N T L OA N B A N K RUP T CY DIS CH AR G E

1139

INTRODUCTION
“I spoke to two lawyers and they both said the same thing: ‘It’s going to be extremely
expensive and you are going to lose . . . .’” That is how Chuck Stewart described to
a journalist his investigation of bankruptcy relief for $60,000 in student loans.1 The
persistent Stewart reportedly was able to eliminate 90% of his debt through
bankruptcy.2 But Chuck Stewarts are decidedly the exception: it is estimated that
only 0.187% of the 238,000 student loan debtors who filed bankruptcy in 2007 even
tried to discharge their loans.3 This is true even though the lawyers Stewart consulted
may only have been half right: in fact, student loan debtors who do seek discharge
enjoy a robust rate of success.4
Why, given good odds, do so few student loan borrowers try for bankruptcy relief?
Probably because the student loan debtor who seeks a discharge must bring an
“adversary proceeding”5—essentially a lawsuit within the bankruptcy6—against the
creditor and must show in that proceeding that repayment would entail “undue
hardship.”7 The adversary proceeding is expensive and unpleasant,8 and courts’
decisions about undue hardship are unpredictable.9 As Professor Rafael Pardo has

1. Araz Hachadourian, Think Students Can’t Declare Bankruptcy? Think Again, YES!
(Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.yesmagazine.org/new-economy/think-students-cant-declare
-bankruptcy-think-again-20150923 [https://perma.cc/H96T-GCGH].
2. Id.
3. See Jason Iuliano, Student Loans and Surmountable Access-to-Justice Barriers, 68
FLA. L. REV. 377, 381–82 (2016); infra notes 118–119 and accompanying text; see also Katy
Stech Ferek, Judges Wouldn’t Consider Forgiving Crippling Student Loans–Until Now, WALL
ST. J. (June 14, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/judges-wouldnt-consider
-forgiving-crippling-student-loans-until-now-1528974001 [https://perma.cc/8CQH-DSKZ]
(reporting that only 473 people sought bankruptcy relief for student loans in 2017).
4. Estimates in published academic papers of rates of success, using different definitions
of the term, range from 39% to 57%. See infra note 120.
5. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(6) (“The following are adversary proceedings: . . . (6) a
proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a debt.”).
6. See 6A BANKRUPTCY SERVICE LAWYERS’ EDITION § 57:11 (2018) (“[A]n ‘adversary
proceeding’ is essentially indistinguishable from a civil action . . . .”).
7. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2018) (excepting student-loan debts from bankruptcy
discharge unless denial of discharge “would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the
debtor’s dependents”).
8. See Rafael I. Pardo, The Undue Hardship Thicket: On Access to Justice, Procedural
Noncompliance, and Pollutive Litigation in Bankruptcy, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2101, 2112 (2014)
[hereinafter Pardo, The Undue Hardship Thicket] (“[T]he consumer bankruptcy bar has
emphasized that many debtors do not have the financial wherewithal to litigate an undue
hardship adversary proceeding.”); see also Tim Chen, Student Loans Have Become Our
Modern-Day Debtors Prisons, USA TODAY (June 5, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.usatoday
.com/story/opinion/2018/06/05/student-loans-crisis-allow-bankruptcy-investigate-abusescolumn/640460002/ [https://perma.cc/L9LW-4Z2F] (“People don’t even try (to get a student
loan discharge) because one, they can’t afford the litigation, but two, they’re just fearful of
having to face that process.”) (quoting John Rao, National Consumer Law Center).
9. Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: An
Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 480–81
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argued, together these conditions deter borrowers from seeking relief even if
repayment in fact subjects them to undue hardship, creating barriers to access to
justice.10
The Department of Education (“Department”) can help such borrowers because
the large majority of student loans outstanding have been made under federal
programs that the Department administers.11 The Department has issued rules
governing when holders of loans made under these programs should consent to
discharge.12 When the holder consents to discharge, it saves the debtor the expense
and uncertainty of further litigating an adversary proceeding.13 The Department’s
discharge rules, then, could help the many debtors who should apply for discharge
but do not—as many as 69,000 per year, according to one estimate.14 The Department
is currently reconsidering these rules,15 and this Article advocates that the
Department honor Congress’s intent in creating student loan programs by creating
more predictable, objective, and generous criteria for consent to discharge.
Despite their importance, the Department’s bankruptcy discharge rules have
received little scholarly attention. The work of Professors Matthew Bruckner, Pamela
Foohey, Brook Gotberg, Dalié Jiménez, and Chrystin Ondersma (the “BFGJO
group”) is an important exception. These authors have published a shorter piece
containing the comments they submitted to the Department about its discharge
consent rules,16 and over forty professors have endorsed those comments.17
Professors Bruckner, Gotberg, Jiménez, and Ondersma have since published a more
detailed explanation and defense of their proposal.18 This Article is the only one to

(2005) [hereinafter Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts].
10. See Pardo, The Undue Hardship Thicket, supra note 8, at 2101.
11. See Trends in Higher Education, COLLEGE BOARD, Fig. 6 (2019),
https://trends.collegeboard.org/student-aid/figures-tables/total-federal-and-nonfederal-loansover-time [https://perma.cc/L6C9-KSEB] (reporting that the percentage of student loans
originated under federal programs in the period 1998–2019 has varied from 75% to 93%).
12. As discussed in more detail in Part I, the Department maintains different sets of rules
for the different programs it administers. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 674.49(c) (2019) (Perkins
program); id. § 682.402(i)(1) (Federal Family Education Loan Program).
13. See, e.g., In re McDowell, 549 B.R. 744, 749 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2016) (indicating that
debtor no longer had to litigate adversary proceeding against Department after its consent to
discharge); In re Conway, 489 B.R. 828, 830 n.2 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2013) (indicating that two
creditors consented to discharge and therefore dropped out of adversary proceeding).
14. See Ron Lieber, Last Plea on School Loans: Proving a Hopeless Future, N.Y. TIMES,
(Aug. 31, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/01/business/shedding-student-loans-in
-bankruptcy-is-an-uphill-battle.html [https://perma.cc/3H69-K6NW].
15. See Request for Information on Evaluating Undue Hardship Claims in Adversary
Actions Seeking Student Loan Discharge in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 83 Fed. Reg. 7460, 7461
(Feb. 21, 2018).
16. See Dalié Jiménez, Matthew Bruckner, Pamela Foohey, Brook Gotberg & Chrystin
Ondersma, Comments of Bankruptcy Scholars on Evaluating Undue Hardship Claims in
Bankruptcy, 21 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 114, 114–24 (2018).
17. Id. at 114.
18. See Matthew Bruckner, Brook Gotberg, Dalié Jiménez & Chrystin Ondersma, A NoContest Discharge for Uncollectable Student Loans, 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 114 (2020).
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date to consider that policy in a context broader than that of the specific proposal
advanced by the BFGJO group.
This Article is also unique in grounding its recommendations for liberalizing
discharge in the purposes of the student loan programs and in advocating for consent
to discharge even where undue hardship is absent. By situating the Department’s
discharge policy within the context of student loan law, rather than just bankruptcy
law, and exploring what the Department can and should do in that framework, this
Article offers the fullest account to date of the administrative law of student loan
bankruptcy.
This Article starts by giving a brief background on student loan
nondischargeability19 and on the three major federal student loan programs.20 It then
reviews the Department’s latest statement on consent to bankruptcy discharge of
federal loans.21 This is a Dear Colleague letter dated July 7, 2015,22 which requires
loan holders to oppose discharge unless doing so would not be cost-effective or the
holder decides that repayment would cause the borrower “undue hardship.”23 This
Article then presents a brief history of the Department rules reflected in the letter.24
This Article makes two sets of recommendations. The first set relates to “transsubstantive” issues,25 that is, issues other than how readily or stingily the Department
consents to discharge.
The first recommendation in this set is that the Department, which has never given
a complete explanation of its regulations,26 explain and defend its bankruptcy
discharge policy more thoroughly than it has done so far. Student loan bankruptcy is
important enough to command more of the Department’s attention than it has to
date.27
Second, the Department should consider notice-and-comment rulemaking to fix
gaps, ambiguities, and nonuniformity in the existing regulations.28 In so doing, it
should weigh the risk of legal attack on the guidance it has issued against the
administrative burden of notice-and-comment rulemaking. The Department
definitely should amend one particular regulation, a restrictive rule governing the
Perkins program that obstructs liberalizing discharge policy.

19. See infra Section I.A.
20. See infra Section I.B.
21. See infra Section I.C.
22. Letter from Lynn Mahaffie, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Policy, Planning, and
Innovation, Office of Postsecondary Educ., Dep’t of Educ. to “Dear Colleague” 1 (July 7,
2015), https://ifap.ed.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/dpcletters/GEN1513.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/R7D6-2BWY] [hereinafter 2015 Dear Colleague Letter].
23. See infra Section I.C.
24. See infra Section I.D.
25. The author uses “trans-substantive” to mean that the Department should consider
them no matter what it decides about the main substantive aspect of the regulations: how
readily to consent to bankruptcy discharge.
26. See infra Section II.A.1.
27. See infra Section II.A.2.
28. See infra Section II.B.

1142

IN DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 95:1137

Third, the Department should reverse the historical trend in the regulations toward
giving loan holders more and more subjective, nontransparent discretion.29 It should
relieve the uncertainty and procedural barriers facing student loan debtors by
announcing specific sets of circumstances under which it will not oppose discharge.
That is, the Department should create “safe harbors” for borrowers. This suggestion,
advanced by the BFGJO group,30 addresses the access-to-justice barriers Pardo has
identified.
The second set of recommendations is “substantive” in that the recommendations
relate to how freely the Department should consent to discharge. This Article
contends that the Department should rethink its stance on consent to bankruptcy
discharge in light of the overall purposes of the student loan programs, most of which
it has not considered to date.31 Specifically, the Department should consent to
discharge more readily in order to further other student loan program goals, which
include promoting equal access to education, creating a more educated population,
safeguarding freedom of career choice, and benefiting borrowers generally.32 For
example, nondischargeability may deter less privileged students from pursuing
higher education or from embarking on lower-paying but valuable careers, thus
interfering with equal access and freedom of career choice. Nondischargeable loans
can and do harm borrowers, thwarting the programs’ purpose of helping students.33
This Article explains that the Department has ample authority to take a more
generous position. The Department could add new grounds, beyond costineffectiveness and undue hardship, for consenting to discharge. The Department has
broad authority to issue regulations governing the student loan programs and,
moreover, is specifically authorized to waive government claims.34 Nothing in the
Higher Education Act or Bankruptcy Code requires the Department to elevate debt
collection over the achievement of other statutory goals or to consent to discharge
only when undue hardship is present.35 Other agencies, including the Internal
Revenue Service and the Department of Justice, have adopted grounds for debt

29. See infra Section II.C.
30. The BFGJO group presents and defends a specific set of recommendations for what
the safe harbors should be. See Jiménez et al., supra note 16, at 115. As discussed below, see
infra Section II.C.2, this author supports their proposal, although this Article is more general
in orientation.
31. See infra Sections III.A–III.B.
32. See infra Section III.B.1. This Article thus recommends a way of addressing the policy
tension Professor Abbye Atkinson has identified between encouraging borrowing on the one
hand and making bankruptcy discharge difficult on the other. See Abbye Atkinson, Race,
Educational Loans & Bankruptcy, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 22 (2010). Professor Jonathan
Glater has made a similar point with regard to debt-financed education generally. See Jonathan
D. Glater, Student Debt and Higher Education Risk, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1561, 1563 (2015)
(arguing that funding education through loans shifts the risk that education will not be
financially successful to students, which “may be counterproductive” to larger goals of federal
support of higher education).
33. For a fuller discussion of these points, see John Patrick Hunt, Tempering Bankruptcy
Nondischargeability to Promote the Purposes of Student-Loan Programs, 72 SMU L. REV.
725, 742–62 (2019).
34. See infra Section III.C.1.
35. See infra Section III.C.2.
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forgiveness or compromise apparently without citing express statutory authorization
for the specific grounds they adopted.36
With an exception for the small Perkins program, the Department could adopt
such rules through issuing guidance, without the delay notice-and-comment
rulemaking entails.37 Notice-and-comment rulemaking does offer borrowers more
predictable rules, however.38 The Department should consider acting through
guidance first and then following up with rules issued after notice and comment.39
Thus, the Department should engage in a deliberate process leading to the
adoption of safe harbors for borrowers, as the BFGJO group has suggested. In
crafting its rules, the Department should not focus narrowly on collection, but should
be guided by all the purposes of the student loan programs, many of which would be
advanced by a more generous discharge consent standard. Nor should the
Department see itself as authorized to consent only where courts applying the
Bankruptcy Code would find undue hardship. By adopting more objective and
generous discharge consent rules, the Department can cast off crabbed and incorrect
views of when discharge is warranted, honor Congressional intent, and relieve the
suffering of thousands of student loan borrowers.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides background on student loan
bankruptcy, the student loan programs, the Department’s current rules on consent to
bankruptcy discharge, and the history of those rules. Part II makes the three
recommendations described above that do not relate to how readily the Department
consents to discharge. Part III argues that the Department should look to the overall
purpose of the student loan programs and consider expanding the circumstances
under which it will consent to discharge, and that it has authority to do so.
I.

THE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT’S BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE RULES

This Part surveys the content and history of the Department’s rules40 on consent
to discharge in borrower bankruptcy. Section I.A provides background on the
nondischargeability of student loans in bankruptcy. Section I.B supplies an overview
of the major federal student loan programs. Section I.C reviews the Department’s
2015 Dear Colleague Letter, which sets forth the Department’s current policy on
consent to bankruptcy discharge. Section I.D gives a brief summary of the history of
the Department’s student loan bankruptcy discharge consent rules.

36. See infra Section III.C.3.
37. See infra Section III.C.4.
38. In particular, rules that are contained only in guidance documents such as the 2015
Dear Colleague Letter can be changed without going through notice-and-comment
rulemaking. See infra Section III.C.4.
39. See infra Section III.C.5.
40. This Article refers to the Department’s discharge consent regulations, its
interpretations of those provisions in the 2015 Dear Colleague Letter, and its statements in the
letter about how it handles consent to discharge under the Ford program collectively as “rules,”
recognizing that the Dear Colleague Letter may not set forth “rules” under the Administrative
Procedure Act. For discussion of the status of the 2015 Dear Colleague Letter under the
Administrative Procedure Act, see infra Section III.C.4.
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A. Student Loan Bankruptcy Nondischargeability
U.S. law provides that a debtor can get a “discharge” of debt by going through a
bankruptcy proceeding.41 After an unsecured loan such as a federal student loan is
discharged, a creditor generally may not attempt to collect it.42 The most common
type of bankruptcy is a Chapter 7 proceeding,43 in which the debtor’s property
(except for certain property specified as exempt) is liquidated and the proceeds paid
to creditors, after which unpaid debts are discharged.44 Not all loans are
dischargeable in bankruptcy, however. For example, a debtor cannot discharge
obligations to pay child support,45 debts arising from the debtor’s willful and
malicious infliction of injury,46 or most fraudulently incurred debts.47
Under section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code, student loans are among these
nondischargeable debts.48 The Bankruptcy Code’s treatment of student loans is more
complex than its treatment of most other nondischargeable debts in that the bar to
relief is not absolute. Student loans can be discharged if the debtor can show that
denial of discharge would “impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s
dependents.”49 A party opposing discharge in an undue-hardship proceeding can
settle by agreeing that the debtor is entitled to discharge.50 The federal government’s
policies on consent to student loan bankruptcy discharge are particularly important
because most outstanding student loans have been issued under the government’s
student loan programs.51

41. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 944(b), 1141, 1228(a), 1328(b) (2018) (providing for discharge
of debts under Chapters 7, 9, 11, 12, and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, respectively).
42. See id. § 524(a).
43. The American Bankruptcy Institute reports that there were 755,182 bankruptcy filings
in 2018, of which 462,681 were Chapter 7 filings. Newsroom: Statistics from Epiq Systems,
December 2018 Bankruptcy Statistics – State and District, AM. BANKR. INST.,
https://www.abi.org/newsroom/bankruptcy-statistics?page=3%2C2 [https://perma.cc/R9DNWLNJ].
44. See 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1) (2018) (Chapter 7 trustee “shall . . . collect and reduce to
money the property of the estate for which such trustee serves”); id. § 727(a) (“[t]he court shall
grant the debtor a discharge” in a Chapter 7 proceeding, with certain exceptions).
45. See id. § 523(a)(5) (providing a debt for a “domestic support obligation” is
nondischargeable); id. § 101(14A) (defining “domestic support obligation” to include child
support).
46. See id. § 523(a)(6).
47. See id. § 523(a)(2).
48. Id. § 523(a)(8). The Code provides for nondischargeability of three distinct categories
of education-related obligations. See id. For simplicity, this Article refers to such obligations
as “student loans.”
49. Id.
50. See Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue
Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 179, 210 (2009) [hereinafter Pardo &
Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal] (discussing resolution of student-loan bankruptcies
by settlement, that is, agreement about whether the debtor “should be granted an undue
hardship discharge”).
51. According to the College Board, student loans originated under federal programs in
the period 1997–2018 have accounted for from 75% (in 2006–07 and 2007–08) to 93% (in
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B. Overview of Major Federal Student Loan Programs
This Article discusses three major federal student loan programs, the Federal
Perkins Loan Program (“Perkins program”), the Federal Family Education Loan
Program (“FFEL program” or FFELP), and the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan
Program (“Ford program”). These are the major programs administered by the
Department of Education: both the 2015 Dear Colleague Letter setting forth the
Department’s bankruptcy discharge policy52 and the Department’s Federal Student
Aid Portfolio Summary53 refer to these, and only these, three programs.54
The Perkins program was the oldest federal student loan program, tracing its
history to the 1958 National Defense Education Act.55 The program expired in
September 2017.56 Perkins loans were made from funds contributed in part by the
government and in part by the student’s institution.57 The higher education institution
is (present tense because Perkins loans are still outstanding although new loans are
not being made) the lender and is usually the party that decides whether to oppose a
borrower’s petition for discharge.58 Perkins loans outstanding at the end of the first

1997–98, 2009–10, 2010–11, and 2011–12) of the dollar value of all student loans. COLLEGE
BOARD, supra note 11.
52. 2015 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 22, at 1.
53. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Federal Student Aid Portfolio Summary, FED. STUDENT AID,
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/student/portfolio [https://perma.cc/LE4AAFRA].
54. Other federal student-loan programs have existed. For example, the HEAL program
provided health-education loans until 1998. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Health Education Assistance
Loan (HEAL) Information, FED. STUDENT AID, https://ifap.ed.gov/health-educationassistance-loan-information [https://perma.cc/H3PP-Y6P5] (reporting that last HEAL loans
were made in 1998). In addition, the TEACH program, which provides grants to people
studying to become teachers, might be considered a student-loan program because TEACH
Grants convert to loans in some circumstances. See U.S. Dep’t of Educ., TEACH Grants, FED.
STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/grants-scholarships/teach [https://perma.cc/
3UUN-35EY].
55. National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
56. See Jack O’Brien, Congress Fails to Reauthorize Federal Perkins Loan Program—
Here’s How It Could Impact Students, NH J. (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.insidesources.com
/congress-fails-reauthorize-federal-perkins-loan-program-heres-impact-students/ [https://per
ma.cc/NUA2-FK94].
57. See Nat’l Ass’n of College & Univ. Bus. Officers, NACUBO Advisory Guidance 1803: Perkins Loan Program Close-Out, NACUBO 3 (August 2018), https://www.nacubo.org//media/Nacubo/Documents/AdvisoryGuidance182PerkinsLoanProgramwinddown81618.ash
x?la=en&hash=6090553A8E2D44FBCAC24FD0CF50A25E62743847 [https://perma.cc/46
X4-B3VL] [hereinafter NACUBO Guidance].
58. See 2015 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 22, at 1–2 (institution as holder decides
whether to oppose discharge). Although the Dear Colleague letter treats the institution’s
holding the loan in borrower bankruptcy as the typical case, it appears that the Department
may become the loan holder if the institution is unable to collect. See 34 C.F.R. § 674.50(a)(1)
(2019) (providing for assignment of defaulted note to United States); id. § 674.50(f)(1)
(providing that United States acquires all “rights, title, and interest in” the loan upon
assignment); id. § 674.50(c)(12) (providing that assigning institution must cooperate with
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quarter of 2020 totaled $5.9 billion, making Perkins the smallest of the three federal
student loan programs discussed here.59
The FFEL program originated in the Higher Education Act of 1965 as the
Guaranteed Student Loan (GSL) program60 and received its current name in 1992.61
Congress terminated the program in 2010 and no new loans have been made under
it since June 30, 2010.62 Under the FFELP, private lenders made loans to students.
Most, if not all, FFELP loans still outstanding are guaranteed by “guaranty
agencies,”63 which can be state government or nonprofit organizations.64 The
guaranty agency reimburses the lender for losses arising from default and other
events.65 The Department in turn reimburses the guaranty agency for its payments to
the private lender, provided certain conditions are met.66 The guaranty agency
typically holds the loan in borrower bankruptcy and decides whether to consent to
discharge.67 At the end of the first quarter of 2020, a total balance of $257.2 billion
was outstanding under the FFELP program.68
Under the Ford program, the federal government makes loans to students69 and
decides on consent to discharge itself.70 After termination of the Perkins and FFELP

Secretary to “enforce the loan or loans”).
59. See U.S. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 53.
60. See U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Federal Student Loan Programs Data Book, FY 1997–FY
2000, ED.GOV, https://www2.ed.gov/finaid/prof/resources/data/fslpdata97-01/edlite-intro
.html [https://perma.cc/AKA9-Q5CC].
61. See id.
62. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
§§ 2201–2208, 124 Stat. 1029, 1074–1077.
63. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.401(b)(5) (2019) (specifying what percentage of loan balance the
guaranty agency is to guarantee).
64. See id. § 682.200 (defining “Guaranty Agency”). Guaranty agencies did not guarantee
all GSL program and FFELP loans. The Department has guaranteed some student loans
directly, without the involvement of a guaranty agency. See, e.g., Guaranteed Student Loan
Program, 44 Fed. Reg. 53,866, 53,884 (Sept. 17, 1979) [hereinafter 1979 GSL Final Rule]
(codified at 45 C.F.R. § 177.503(a)(2) (2019)) (describing basic structure of federally insured
student loan program contract). The Department withdrew regulations governing such
arrangements in 2013. See Student Assistance General Provisions, Federal Perkins Loan
Program, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan
Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 65,768, 65,820 (Nov. 1, 2013) (removing and reserving subpart E of
34 C.F.R. pt. 682, which had governed guaranteed loans guaranteed directly by the federal
government without the involvement of a guaranty agency). The 2015 Dear Colleague Letter
does not mention federally insured loans. See 2015 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 22.
65. See 34 C.F.R § 682.100(b)(1) (establishing an exception for loans guaranteed directly
by government, but stating generally that “a guaranty agency guarantees a lender against losses
due to default by the borrower on a FFEL loan”).
66. See id. § 682.404(a) (specifying that government will pay guaranty agency 95 to 100%
of the agency’s default claim losses on FFEL loans, depending on when loan was made).
67. See id. § 682.402(i).
68. See U.S. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 53.
69. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.100(a) (“Under the William D. Ford Direct Loan Program . . . ,
the Secretary makes loans to enable a student or parent to pay the costs of the student’s
attendance at a postsecondary school.”).
70. See 2015 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 22, at 1 (noting that Department follows
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programs, the Ford program is the only one of the three still making loans. A total
balance of $1.251 trillion was outstanding under the Ford program at the end of the
first quarter of 2020,71 making it the largest federal student loan program.
C. The 2015 Dear Colleague Letter
A Dear Colleague letter from the Department dated July 7, 2015 (“2015 Dear
Colleague Letter”) sets out the Department’s current policies governing what loan
holders are to do in deciding whether to object to discharge of student loans in
bankruptcy.72 The letter covers three federally supported loan programs: the Ford
program, the FFELP, and the Perkins program.73 The 2015 Dear Colleague Letter is
based on regulations governing the FFEL and Perkins programs;74 the Ford program
does not have its own regulations governing the Department’s response to
bankruptcy.
The identity of the loan holder varies depending on the loan program. The holder
is the Department itself for direct loans.75 The holder is usually a guaranty agency
for FFEL program loans76 and is usually a higher education institution for Perkins
loans.77 However, the substance of the analysis the letter prescribes is the same for
all three programs.78 A uniform approach seems sensible because a borrower may
have loans of more than one type, although different entities will be responsible for
making decisions for the different programs in that case.
The letter describes a two-step analysis. In the first step, the holder must determine
whether it believes that the borrower will suffer “undue hardship” if the loan is not
discharged.79 The letter is arguably ambiguous about what the holder is to do if it
reaches the “clear conclusion”80 that discharge is necessary to avert undue hardship.

the same discharge consent analysis for Ford program loans as it prescribes for holders of
FFELP and Perkins loans).
71. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 53.
72. 2015 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 22, at 1 (citing regulations governing
treatment of FFEL and Perkins, but not Direct Loan Program, loans in bankruptcy).
73. The letter does not cover some older loan programs, such as the federally insured GSL
program discussed below and the HEAL Program. The HEAL program regulations do not
discuss consent to discharge. See 34 C.F.R. § 681.1 (2019). New loans under the HEAL
program stopped in 1998, the program loan balance outstanding dropped to $187 million by
2014, and the HEAL regulations apparently are not historically linked to the Ford regulations
as the FFEL and Perkins regulations are. See Health Education Assistance Loan Program, 82
Fed. Reg. 53,374, 53,374–75 (Nov. 15, 2017) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 681). Thus, this
Article does not further discuss the HEAL program.
74. 2015 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 22, at 1.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id. (“While this letter addresses the holders of FFELP and Perkins loans, the
Department follows the same two-step analysis when evaluating whether to consent or not
object to a borrower’s claim of undue hardship for the William D. Ford Direct Loan Program
(Direct Loans), or for FFELP and/or Perkins loans the Department holds.”).
79. Id. at 1–2.
80. Id. at 11. Elsewhere, the letter refers to the “conclusion” that repayment would impose
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At one point, the letter states that the holder “should consent to, or not oppose, the
discharge”81 in this circumstance. At another point, it states that the holder “can”
consent to discharge if undue hardship is present.82 The latter formulation could be
read to mean that the holder has the freedom to choose whether to consent, but
probably the “should consent” is controlling. Given that the Department is instructing
holders about what to do, “should” most likely indicates a requirement rather than a
mere suggestion.83 So read, “should” is consistent with “can,” whereas interpreting
“can” to mean “may choose whether to” is inconsistent with “should.” The “should”
interpretation thus technically gives effect to both terms, although it is strange for the
Department to say the holder “can” do something when it means “should.”
“Undue hardship” is a term used in the Bankruptcy Code and courts have
interpreted it in that context.84 The 2015 Dear Colleague Letter states that holders’
analysis of undue hardship “would necessarily be made according to the legal
standards set by the Federal courts,”85 asserting that the Congress “has not delegated
to the Department the authority” to define “undue hardship.”86 The letter discusses
two tests the federal courts have used to evaluate undue hardship, the Brunner test
and the totality-of-the-circumstances test. 87
If the holder determines that “requiring repayment would not impose an undue
hardship,”88 analysis proceeds to a second step. In that step, the holder must “evaluate
the cost of objecting to the borrower’s claim of undue hardship in court.”89
Specifically, the holder is to determine whether “the costs to pursue the matter in
bankruptcy court are estimated to exceed one-third the total amount owed on the
loan.”90 If the estimated costs do exceed the one-third threshold, the holder “may

undue hardship. Id. at 10.
81. Id. at 10.
82. Id. at 2 (stating that the holder “can consent to or not oppose the discharge”).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 724 F.3d 949, 955 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that
“both words”—that is, “should” and “must”—are “imperative when used to instruct a jury on
whether to convict a defendant”); United States v. Kerley, 838 F.2d 932, 940 (7th Cir. 1988)
(finding no substantive difference between “should” and “must” when used in jury
instructions); State v. Lovelace, 607 P.2d 49, 55 (Kan. 1980) (“should” and “must” “can be
used interchangeably in criminal instructions”).
84. See e.g., Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Discharge of Student Loan on Ground of
Undue Hardship Under Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(8)(B))—Good Faith
Based on Compliance with Congressional Policy, 59 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 563 (2011) (collecting
decisions); Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Discharge of Student Loan on Ground of Undue
Hardship Under Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(8)(B))—Good Faith Based
on Making Payments and Negotiating Repayment Plan, 62 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 545 (2012); Ann
K. Wooster, Annotation, Discharge of Student Loan on Ground of Undue Hardship Under
Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(8)(B))—Good Faith Based on Maximizing
Income and Minimizing Expenses, 60 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 375 (2011).
85. 2015 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 22, at 3.
86. Id.
87. This Article discusses those tests infra at Section III.B.2.
88. 2015 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 22, at 2.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 3.
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accept and/or not oppose an undue hardship claim.”91 If the estimated costs fall under
the one-third limit, the holder apparently “must” oppose discharge.92
The 2015 Dear Colleague Letter is a guidance document rather than a regulation.93
The regulations for the Perkins and FFEL programs control those programs and are
the source of the rules in the letter,94 although the letter reflects the Department’s
interpretation of the regulations and does not simply repeat them.
D. Overview of Discharge Consent Regulation History
Section I.D gives a summary overview of the history of the regulations governing
consent to discharge in student loan bankruptcies. A companion paper gives a
complete history of the regulations.95
As discussed, the Department’s current rules governing consent to discharge
contemplate a two-step analysis. First, the holder evaluates whether discharge is
necessary to avert “undue hardship” on the borrower’s part. Second, the holder
determines whether opposing discharge is cost-effective (that is, would cost less than
one-third the amount outstanding on the loan).96
The Perkins program is the source of the two-step framework, which originates
in Perkins program rules adopted in 1987.97 The only later development of interest
in the Perkins rules is that the Department amended them in 1999 to add the statement
that the “institution must use due diligence . . . to avoid discharge of the loan.”98 As
discussed below,99 this requirement is of unclear scope.

91. Id. at 3–4.
92. Id. at 11. The quoted sentence actually does not refer to the one-third test by name.
Instead, it states that the holder must oppose discharge “unless the cost of opposing it warrants
otherwise, as set forth in 34 C.F.R. §§ 674.49(c) and 682.402(i)(1).” Id. The reference to cost
of opposition is presumably to the one-third test, which is the only test for cost-effectiveness
mentioned in the letter and is described in the regulations the quoted sentence cites. See id.;
34 C.F.R. §§ 674.49(c), 682.402(i)(1) (2019). The cited regulations govern the Perkins and
FFEL programs respectively. See 34 C.F.R. pt. 674 (Perkins); id. pt. 682 (FFEL). Interestingly,
the letter discusses evaluating cost-effectiveness of discharge litigation five times, see 2015
Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 22, at 2, 3–4, 8 & n.5, 11, and mentions the one-third test
only once (in addition to the cross-reference to the test at 11). One might speculate that this
treatment suggests a discomfort with the rigid one-third test and an interest in a more nuanced
analysis of cost-effectiveness.
93. 2015 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 22, at 1 (“This letter provides
guidance . . . .”).
94. Id. (providing guidance to holders “as they continue to implement [Perkins and
FFELP regulations] which govern their actions in defending bankruptcy adversary
proceedings” and “to assist loan holders in fulfilling their regulatory duty”).
95. See John Patrick Hunt, The Development of Student Loan Bankruptcy Policy, 45 J.C.
& U.L. 85, 89–110 (2020).
96. See supra Section I.C.
97. See Perkins Loan Program, 52 Fed. Reg. 45,552, 45,560 (Nov. 30, 1987) (codified at
34 C.F.R. § 674.49(b)(2)) [hereinafter 1987 Perkins Rules].
98. Federal Perkins Loan Program, 64 Fed. Reg. 58,298, 58,313 (Oct. 28, 1999) (codified
at 34 C.F.R. § 674.49(c)(1)) [hereinafter 1999 Perkins Rules].
99. See infra Section II.B.1.

1150

IN DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 95:1137

Turning to the GSL program, and its successor, the FFEL program, here the
Department first adopted bankruptcy discharge opposition rules in 1986. These rules
provided that holders “shall diligently contest” discharge.100 In 1992, the Department
adopted rules for the FFEL program that prescribed a two-step process paralleling
the one it adopted for the Perkins program in 1987.101 In 1999, the Department added
to the FFEL rules a requirement that holders “must use diligence . . . to avoid
discharge of the loan.”102 As with the corresponding requirement for the Perkins
program, the scope here is unclear. In 2001, the Department added that the holder
“may, but is not required to” oppose discharge if it determines that the cost of doing
so would be more than one-third the balance due on the loan.103
As for the Ford program, no regulations govern consent to discharge under it. The
Department’s 2015 Dear Colleague Letter appears to be the only source of guidance
for this, the largest student loan program. It is not clear why there are no regulations;
perhaps their absence reflects the Department’s commitment to reserve the “full
discretion accorded [it]” under the statutes, as it declared its intention to do in
1985.104
II. “TRANS-SUBSTANTIVE” OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Part II offers observations and recommendations on “trans-substantive” aspects
of the rules, that is, aspects other than how readily the Department grants or
withholds discharge. “Trans-substantive” is in quotation marks because some of the
recommendations, such as the recommendation to create safe harbors, may affect the
substance of the regulations. However, the effect of such recommendations is
different enough from actually adding new grounds for consent to discharge that they
are included here. Part II addresses three aspects of the rules: (1) thoughtfulness; (2)
completeness, uniformity, and clarity; and (3) predictability.

100. Guaranteed Student Loan and PLUS Programs, 51 Fed. Reg. 40,886, 40,905 (Nov.
10, 1986) (codified at 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(g)(1)) [hereinafter 1986 GSL PLUS Final
Regulations].
101. See Federal Family Educational Loan Programs, 57 Fed. Reg. 60,280, 60,349 (Dec.
18, 1992) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(g)(1)) [hereinafter 1992 FFEL Rules].
102. Federal Family Education Loan Program and William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan
Program, 64 Fed. Reg. 58,938, 58,960 (Nov. 1, 1999) (codified at 34 C.F.R.
§ 682.402(i)(1)(iv)) [hereinafter 1999 FFEL Ford Final Rules].
103. Federal Family Education Loan Program and William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan
Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 34,762, 34,763 (June 29, 2001) (codified at 34 C.F.R.
§ 682.402(i)(1)(iii)) [hereinafter 2001 FFEL Ford Final Rules].
104. Guaranteed Student Loan Program and PLUS Program, 50 Fed. Reg. 35,964, 35,966
(Sept. 4, 1985) (codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 682–83) [hereinafter 1985 GSL PLUS NPRM].
Although the Department has stated that it follows the process set forth in the 2015 Dear
Colleague Letter, see supra Section I.C, that letter is subject to being changed without noticeand-comment rulemaking, see infra note 380 and accompanying text. Thus, in the absence of
regulations, the Department enjoys considerable freedom of action.
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A. On Thoughtful Rules
It is currently difficult to tell why the Department has the rules it does because its
rules were offered with very little explanation.105 In particular, the Department
apparently has never considered whether its bankruptcy discharge policies do or
should reflect the overall purposes of the student loan programs.106 The Department
should offer a better account of the reasons for its policies, and its current proceeding
to reconsider the rules offers an excellent opportunity to do so.
1. The Rules Have Been Issued Without Thorough Explanation
The Department took the key steps in the development of discharge consent policy
with little or no explanation. The proposal to require holders to oppose discharge
appeared in a 1985 notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) for the Perkins program.
The single sentence supporting the proposal stated that it “reflect[ed] changes in
bankruptcy law.”107 A NPRM later that year for the FFELP’s predecessor, the GSL
program, proposed a requirement that guaranty agencies “diligently contest”
discharge,108 which was adopted as a final rule in 1986.109 The Department did not
offer a specific justification for either proposal.110
The 1987 Perkins final rule adopting the two-step framework in effect today was
explained in a single paragraph. That paragraph defended the decision to issue
regulations rather than the regulations’ content, although there is a suggestion that
the Department was trying to avoid litigation costs that did not generate a financial
return.111
A 1990 NPRM that proposed to apply the Perkins two-step framework to the
much larger GSL program provided no specific explanation for the proposal.112 The
NPRM did reference “various policy initiatives designed to reduce defaults and
increase collection on loans that do go into default,” and perhaps this was an oblique
reference to the new bankruptcy rules, but there was no further explanation.113 The

105. For the history of the Department’s regulations, see Hunt, supra note 95, at 89–110.
106. See infra Sections III.A–III.B.1.
107. National Direct Student Loan Program, 50 Fed. Reg. 7872, 7873 (Feb. 26, 1985)
(codified at 34 C.F.R. § 674.49) [hereinafter 1985 NDSL/Perkins NPRM].
108. 1985 GSL PLUS NPRM, supra note 104, at 35,981.
109. 1986 GSL PLUS Final Regulations, supra note 100, at 40,905.
110. See 1985 GSL PLUS NPRM, supra note 104; 1986 GSL PLUS Final Regulations,
supra note 100.
111. See 1987 Perkins Rules, supra note 97, at 45,555 (“[B]ecause the regulations now
permit institutions to charge to the Fund the costs of the litigation required in bankruptcy, it is
appropriate to prescribe here the circumstances in which particular activities are reasonable
and cost-effective.”).
112. See Guaranteed Student Loan Programs, 55 Fed. Reg. 48,324 (Nov. 20, 1990)
[hereinafter 1990 GSL NPRM].
113. Id. at 48,324. The quoted language may not have referred to default: it appears that
bankruptcy generally is not a default on FFELP loans. See U.S. Dep’t Educ., Student Loan
Delinquency and Default, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans
/default#default [https://perma.cc/D66L-TE9S] (defining “default” as failure to make
scheduled payments for 270 days).
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1992 FFEL final rule adopted the discharge opposition proposal from the 1990
NPRM without any discussion at all.114 Nor did the Department give a justification
for its 1999115 and 2001116 changes to the FFEL and Perkins regulations.
As for the Ford program, the largest federal loan program by far and the only one
of the three that is still making loans, we have only a Dear Colleague letter that
describes, but does not defend, the two-step analytical framework that it apparently
borrowed from the FFEL and Perkins regulations.117
2. The Department Should Thoughtfully Explain Its Rules
The Department’s relative inattention to discharge consent policy is inappropriate
in light of the importance of student loan bankruptcies. Jason Iuliano has estimated
that over 238,000 debtors with student loans made consumer bankruptcy filings in
2007,118 but only a tiny fraction of student loan debtors who filed bankruptcy sought
to discharge their student loans.119 Given the relatively high rate of relief for cases

114. See 1992 FFEL Rules, supra note 101.
115. See 1999 FFEL Ford Final Rules, supra note 102; 1999 Perkins Rules, supra note 98.
116. See 2001 FFEL Ford Final Rules, supra note 103.
117. See supra Section I.C.
118. Jason Iuliano, An Empirical Assessment of Student Loan Discharges and the Undue
Hardship Standard, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 495, 504 (2012) (deriving estimate by multiplying
the percentage of bankruptcy debtors who indicated in the Consumer Bankruptcy Project
survey that they had student debt by the total number of bankruptcy filings). Although
Professor Rafael Pardo has criticized Iuliano’s study at length, the criticisms do not seem to
extend to this particular estimate. See Pardo, The Undue Hardship Thicket, supra note 8, at
2122–42 (criticizing several aspects of Iuliano’s study but not his estimate of the total number
of student-loan consumer bankruptcy filings).
119. Iuliano estimates that the fraction is “0.1” percent. Iuliano, supra note 118, at 505. He
examines adversary proceedings to discharge student debt filed against the ten largest studentloan lenders (and Educational Credit Management Corporation) in 2007. Id. at 502. The
surveyed entities reportedly held 71.2% of student loans in that year, so Iuliano estimates that
71.2% of the 238,446 bankrupt debtors with student loans, or 169,774 debtors total, owed
money to these entities. Id. at 504–05. He then reports based on PACER searches that 217
adversary proceedings to discharge student debt, filed by 213 separate debtors, were initiated
against the ten lenders and ECMC. Id. at 503. From these numbers, one can compute an
estimate of the overall rate at which student-loan debtors sought discharge: 213/169,774 =
0.125%. This computation is apparently the basis for the 0.1% number in Iuliano’s text. See
id. at 504–05. Pardo subsequently argued that Iuliano’s method probably undercounted
adversary proceedings. See Pardo, The Undue Hardship Thicket, supra note 8, at 2127–29. In
response, Iuliano counted the number of student-loan adversary proceedings directly by
searching PACER on a special “nature of suit” (NOS) code for such proceedings in a way that
he asserted was not possible when he conducted his initial study. This search found that 445
student loan debtors filed undue hardship proceedings during 2007. See Iuliano, supra note 3,
at 381–82. The author makes the following observations: because the 445 adversary
proceedings found using the NOS code is the total number of suits filed in the United States
against all defendants, we can estimate the rate at which student-loan debtors filed adversary
proceedings by dividing 445 by the total number of student-loan debtors who filed bankruptcy.
Using Iuliano’s estimate of 238,446 student-loan bankruptcies in 2007 for the latter number,
we arrive at an estimate of 445/238,446 = 0.187% for the rate at which bankrupt student-loan
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that are actually brought120 and the cost and uncertainty that currently attend student
loan discharge proceedings,121 more bankrupt debtors probably should try to
discharge their student loans. It is reasonable to suppose that many borrowers are
living with undue hardship created by their student loans.
Student loan bankruptcy remains vital despite the advent of income-driven
repayment (IDR) plans that base loan payments on the borrower’s income. Although
IDR programs do reduce the need for bankruptcy proceedings by reducing payments,
bankruptcy remains important because IDR may extend indebtedness,122 result in
negative amortization,123 and impose significant tax burdens when debt is forgiven
at the end of the IDR period.124 For debtors with unavoidable high expenses, such as

debtors initiate adversary proceedings in bankruptcy. Although this computation suggests that
Iuliano may have underestimated the rate of filing by about a third, 0.187% is, like 0.125%, a
tiny fraction. Even the 0.187% estimate can be criticized because some adversary proceedings
are filed in a year after the year in which the bankruptcy is filed, see Pardo, The Undue
Hardship Thicket, supra note 8, at 2126–27, so that the 445 and the 238,446 are not perfectly
comparable. Moreover, perhaps applying the rate of owing student loans from the Consumer
Bankruptcy Project sample to the entire population of bankruptcy debtors could be criticized.
However, these issues do not seem likely to change the fundamental conclusion that only a
tiny fraction of student-loan debtors seek discharge.
120. Iuliano finds that 39% of student-loan debtors who filed adversary proceedings in
2007 seeking discharge of their loans received a full or partial discharge, and that 12% more
received administrative repayment plans. See Iuliano, supra note 118, at 505. Other
researchers have made broadly similar findings. See Rafael I. Pardo, Taking Bankruptcy Rights
Seriously, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1115, 1118, 1137–38 (2016) (finding in study of 1430 studentloan discharge proceedings from around the country that debtors experienced litigation
success, designated as entry of an order granting any form of relief, 39% of the time); Pardo
& Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 50, at 213 (concluding based on review
of 115 cases filed in the Western District of Washington in 2002 to 2006 that “[a]pproximately
57% of the adversary proceedings resulted in an undue hardship discharge”); Pardo & Lacey,
Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts, supra note 9, at 410, 479 (concluding based on
examination of bankruptcy-court opinions issued from 1993 to 2003 that “[m]ore than half
(57%) of the 286 discharge determinations in the sample granted the debtor some form of
relief—whether in the form of full discharge, partial discharge, or equitable adjustment” and
that “[n]early half (45%) of the discharge determinations analyzed concluded that failing to
discharge a debtor’s student loans would impose an undue hardship on the debtor”); Aaron N.
Taylor & Daniel J. Sheffner, Oh, What a Relief It (Sometimes) Is: An Analysis of Chapter 7
Bankruptcy Petitions to Discharge Student Loans, 27 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 295, 320 (2016)
(based on a sample of cases filed between 2005 and 2014, finding undue-hardship discharge
rates of 54% for the First Circuit and 24% for the Third Circuit in cases where the proceeding
went all the way to an undue-hardship decision); id. at 323 (finding overall rates of studentloan relief of 51% in the First Circuit and 46% in the Third Circuit when considering all cases
in which relief was sought, not just ones that went to decision, and when considering
settlements and default judgments in addition to undue-hardship discharges as forms of relief).
121. See infra Section II.C.2.
122. See John Patrick Hunt, Help or Hardship? Income-Driven Repayment in StudentLoan Bankruptcies, 108 GEO. L.J. 1287, 1333–38 (2018).
123. See id. at 1339–40.
124. See id. at 1340–49.
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medical costs, IDR may be unaffordable.125 Moreover, IDR is an inappropriate
solution to overwhelming indebtedness when the debt has been in repayment for
more than five years and there is no prospect of significant financial recovery. That
is because financial recovery is the only justification Congress advanced for
nondischargeability of such older student debts.126
Reflecting the continuing importance of student loan bankruptcy, the Department
issued a request for information on the subject in 2018. The Department invited the
public to comment on the “circumstances under which loan holders should concede
an undue hardship claim by the borrower” and “whether and how the 2015 Dear
Colleague Letter should be amended,” among other questions about the
Department’s undue-hardship policy.127 Response to the Department’s call was
robust. The Department received 419 comments, notably including responses from
the offices of the Attorneys General of New York and Massachusetts and from
stakeholder groups such as the Consumer Bankers Association, the National
Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators, the National Consumer Law
Center, and the Student Loan Servicing Alliance.128 The Department should stay the
course, consider the input it has received, and produce a carefully and thoroughly
reasoned statement of its bankruptcy policies.
One set of comments is particularly noteworthy. Twenty-one academics (a
number that later grew to over forty) suggested that the Department presume undue
hardship for borrowers who meet certain objective criteria.129 In other words, these
commenters suggest that the Department adopt “safe harbors” for borrowers, an idea
this Article discusses in Section II.C.2.
B. On Complete, Uniform, and Clear Rules
The Department’s discharge consent rules are incomplete, nonuniform, and
ambiguous. Although the 2015 Dear Colleague Letter, generously interpreted,
addresses these issues, it is only a guidance document. The Department should
consider notice-and-comment rulemaking to fix the regulations themselves.
1. The Rules Have Been Incomplete, Nonuniform, and Ambiguous
Both the Perkins and the FFEL regulations have significant gaps and ambiguities
(collectively called “defects” here). The 2015 Dear Colleague Letter probably fills

125. See id. at 1330–33.
126. See id. at 1338–39.
127. Request for Information on Evaluating Undue Hardship Claims in Adversary Actions
Seeking Student Loan Discharge in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 83 Fed. Reg. 7460, 7461 (Feb.
21, 2018).
128. See Request for Information on Evaluating Undue Hardship Claims in Adversary
Actions Seeking Student Loan Discharge in Bankruptcy Proceedings Under 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(8), REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=ED-2017-OPE-0085
[https://perma.cc/B4F3-U9UJ]. The academics’ comments also appear at Jiménez et al., supra
note 16. Over forty academics had signed on to the comments by the time of law-review
publication. Id. at 114.
129. See Jiménez et al., supra note 16, at 115.
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those gaps and resolves those ambiguities, although it may itself be ambiguous in at
least one respect.
The first defect is that neither the Perkins nor the FFEL regulations have ever
explicitly told the holder what to do if it determines that repayment would entail
undue hardship.130 However, in each case only the absence of undue hardship triggers
a second step of analysis, the comparison of likely costs of opposing discharge to
one-third of the loan balance.131 That the presence of undue hardship terminates the
analysis before consideration of the costs of opposing discharge strongly suggests
that the holder either may or must consent to discharge if undue hardship is present,
although it sheds no light on whether the operative verb is “may” or “must.” The
2015 Dear Colleague Letter probably fills the gap here. It provides that if repayment
would cause undue hardship, the holder “should consent to or not oppose the
discharge,”132 although the letter may be ambiguous on this point.133
The second defect is that the FFEL and Perkins regulations are ambiguous. Each
has a provision of unclear scope, added in 1999 without substantive explanation, that
holders “must use due diligence . . . to avoid discharge of the loan.”134 These
provisions could be interpreted to impose an unqualified duty to oppose discharge in
all circumstances. Because these provisions may impose a universal duty to oppose
discharge, while another part of each program’s regulations provides a two-step
framework for deciding whether to oppose discharge,135 the regulations are
ambiguous. Although universally mandating opposition probably is not the 1999
insertions’ purpose,136 the provisions detract from the regulations’ clarity. The 2015
Dear Colleague Letter deals with the ambiguity after a fashion: it simply ignores the
1999 requirements, perhaps reflecting an implicit interpretation that they specify the
diligence required once a holder has decided to oppose discharge, rather than
instructing the holder when to oppose discharge in the first place.
The third defect relates to the regulations’ one-third-of-balance test, the second
step in the two-step analysis the regulations prescribe.137 If the holder determines that
undue hardship is absent, both the Perkins and the FFEL regulations direct the holder
to compare the expected costs of opposing discharge with one-third the loan

130. For the GSL/FFEL program, see 2001 FFEL Ford Final Rules, supra note 103; 1999
FFEL Ford Final Rules, supra note 102; 1992 FFEL Rules, supra note 101; 1986 GSL PLUS
Final Regulations, supra note 100. For the Perkins program, see 1999 Perkins Rules, supra
note 98; 1987 Perkins Rules, supra note 97. As discussed, no regulations govern the Ford
program. See supra Section I.D.
131. See 34 C.F.R. § 674.49(c)(4) (2019) (Perkins); id. § 682.402(i)(1)(iii) (FFEL).
132. 2015 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 22, at 10.
133. See id. at 2 (providing that holder “can” consent to discharge if undue hardship is
present). Section II.B.1, supra, discusses the ambiguity.
134. 1999 Perkins Rules, supra note 98, at 58,313 (“[I]nstitution must use due diligence .
. . to avoid discharge of the loan.”); 1999 FFEL Ford Final Rules, supra note 102, at 58,960
(holders “must use diligence . . . to avoid discharge of the loan”).
135. See supra notes 97 (Perkins), 101 (FFELP).
136. The detailed two-step process for deciding whether to oppose discharge would be
superfluous if the cited provisions always required holders to do so. It seems likely, though
not certain, that the cited provisions govern holders’ conduct once they have decided to oppose
discharge, or at least not to consent to it. See Hunt, supra note 95, at 92, 96–97, 106–07.
137. See supra Section I.D.
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balance.138 However, the regulations for the two programs differ in the consequence
of the comparison. The Perkins regulations prescribe that the holder “shall” oppose
discharge if the cost of opposition is less than one-third of the balance.139 The FFEL
regulations, which once contained the same requirement,140 now prescribe that the
holder “may, but is not required to” oppose discharge if the cost of opposition is more
than one-third of the balance.141
Thus, the regulations also have gaps relating to the one-third test: the Perkins
regulations are silent about what to do if estimated costs exceed one-third of the loan
balance,142 and the FFEL regulations are silent about what to do if estimated costs
are less than one-third of the balance.143
Moreover, the one-third test is nonuniform across programs: the shall-oppose-ifless-than-one-third requirement of the Perkins program differs from the may-opposeif-more-than-one-third requirement of the FFEL program. Ideally, the rules probably
should be uniform. Debtors may have more than one type of loan; there does not
appear to be a substantive reason to have different rules for different programs, and
relatedly, the difference that exists seems to be one of wording rather than a policy
choice.144
The 2015 Dear Colleague Letter appears to impose uniformity and fill the gaps.
It provides, for all three programs, that if undue hardship is absent and the estimated
cost of litigation is less than one-third the loan balance, the holder “must” oppose
discharge,145 while the holder “may” consent to discharge if the estimated litigation
cost is greater than one-third of the loan balance.146
The 2015 Dear Colleague Letter’s resolution of the first two defects might be
considered “pro-bankrupt-debtor.” The letter specifies that the holder “should
consent” to discharge in cases of undue hardship and reads out of the regulations a
provision that could be read to require universal opposition to discharge.147
The letter’s approach to the third defect, by contrast, is “anti-bankrupt-debtor” in
its effect. Gaps about what to do if expected opposition costs fall below the one-third
threshold are filled with the “must oppose discharge” requirement from the Perkins
regulations148 when “may oppose discharge” would be a plausible alternative for the
non-Perkins programs. Likewise, gaps about what to do if expected costs exceed the

138. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 674.49(c)(4), 682.402(i)(1)(iii) (2019).
139. See id. §§ 674.49(c)(5), 682.402(i)(1)(iii).
140. See 1992 FFEL Rules, supra note 101, at 60,349.
141. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(i)(1)(iii).
142. See 34 C.F.R. § 674.49(c).
143. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(i).
144. If the Department adds grounds for consent to discharge as this Article suggests
without engaging in notice-and-comment rulemaking to amend the restrictive Perkins
regulations, rules that are nonuniform across programs could result. See infra Sections III.C.4–
III.C.5. A desire for uniformity should not in this case overcome the important substantive
interest in promoting the programs’ goals by liberalizing discharge, particularly in light of the
small size of the Perkins program.
145. 2015 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 22, at 11.
146. Id. at 3–4.
147. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.

2020]

S T U DE N T L OA N B A N K RUP T CY DIS CH AR G E

1157

one-third threshold are filled with the “may consent to discharge” provision from the
FFEL regulations149 when “must consent to discharge” would be a plausible
alternative for the non-FFEL programs. Although both these decisions promote a
desirable uniformity across programs, they are unfriendly to bankrupt student loan
debtors.
2. The Department Should Consider Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking to
Complete, Make Uniform, and Clarify the Rules
This Section argues that the Department should consider remedying the defects
in the regulations with notice-and-comment rulemaking, the process required for the
Department to amend its discharge-consent regulations.150 It first addresses ratifying
the pro-borrower provisions of the 2015 Dear Colleague Letter and then considers
rejecting the anti-borrower provisions.
For the pro-bankrupt-debtor aspects of the letter (i.e., consent to discharge in case
of undue hardship and restricted scope of possible universal-opposition section of
regulations), a reason for the Department to consider notice-and-comment
rulemaking is that the Dear Colleague Letter, a guidance document, may not be
authoritative. At least for the Perkins and FFEL programs, the 2015 Dear Colleague
Letter interprets existing regulations.151 But agencies’ claim to deference to their
interpretations of their regulations is under threat in the Supreme Court.152 Although
the 2015 Dear Colleague Letter’s status as a guidance document might shield it on
finality and ripeness grounds from judicial review,153 there is no assurance of such
protection. Accordingly, the 2015 Dear Colleague Letter may be vulnerable. Noticeand-comment rulemaking would enable the Department to issue new regulations that
unambiguously reflect the 2015 Dear Colleague Letter’s position and would
therefore be immune from attack as improper interpretations of regulations.

149. See supra notes 140–41and accompanying text.
150. See Homemakers North Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987)
(“[O]nce a regulation is adopted by notice-and-comment rulemaking . . . its text can only be
amended in that fashion.”); see also 1 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. & RICHARD MURPHY,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PRACTICE § 4:60 (2018) (“[A]n agency must follow notice-andcomment rulemaking in order to amend or repeal a legislative rule.”).
151. See 2015 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 22, at 1–2.
152. Current precedent provides for judicial deference to agencies’ interpretations of their
own regulations. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 463 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock
& Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). The Court recently upheld the so-called Auer deference
doctrine, but Justice Roberts, the deciding vote, did so on the ground of stare decisis only. See
Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2424 (2019) (Roberts, J., concurring in part). Justice Roberts
wrote separately to emphasize that the difference between the Auer doctrine as formulated in
Kisor and no deference at all “is not as great as it may initially appear,” id., and Justice
Kavanaugh also emphasized this point, id. at 2448 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Justice
Gorsuch described the decision as “more a stay of execution than a pardon” for the Auer
doctrine. Id. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
153. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of
Guidance Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331, 375 (2011) (“[D]octrines of finality and ripeness
often shield the agency from the potentially paralyzing effects of ‘direct’ substantive judicial
review of guidance documents—that is, review of such documents when issued.”).
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A major reason not to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking is the familiar
point that that process is costlier and more time-consuming than issuing a guidance
document.154 That issue is relatively significant here, where risk of legal attack may
not be that great: the two pro-borrower provisions have not, to the author’s
knowledge, been controversial. On the other hand, as discussed shortly, this Article
unequivocally recommends notice-and-comment rulemaking for at least the Perkins
program.155 If the Department is carrying out a rulemaking anyway, there may not
be much additional burden involved in addressing the provisions under discussion.
To be sure, additional considerations could potentially be relevant.156 But the
decision about notice and comment to ratify the two pro-borrower provisions
depends on weighing the resource consumption of such a process against the legal
risk of relying solely on a guidance document.
We now turn to the anti-bankrupt-debtor provision of the 2015 Dear Colleague
Letter, the one that unnecessarily requires opposition to discharge if the cost of
opposition would be less than one third of the loan balance and unnecessarily permits
opposition to discharge if the cost of opposition would be more than one third of the
loan balance.157 Here, this Article’s recommendation is unequivocal: the Department
should engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking, at least to amend the Perkins
regulations’ provision that the holder “shall” oppose discharge if undue hardship is
absent and expected opposition costs fall below the one-third threshold.158
The reason is that the “shall oppose” requirement is counter to the central
recommendation of this Article. As explained below, the Department can promote
the purposes of the student loan programs more effectively by providing for consent
to discharge on substantive grounds other than undue hardship.159 For example, it
could consent on the grounds of borrower discouragement or harm.160 The Perkins
“shall oppose” regulation makes it difficult to implement this suggestion—at least
for the Perkins program—because it requires the holder to oppose discharge
whenever undue hardship is absent and opposition is expected to cost less than one-

154. See Steven J. Lindsay, Timing Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations in
Chevron’s Shadow, 127 YALE L.J. 2448, 2451 (2017) (“Th[e] process of notice-and-comment
rulemaking can be costly and time-consuming.”). The Department is subject to a special
provision requiring it to engage in a negotiated rulemaking process before starting notice and
comment. See 20 U.S.C. § 1098a(b)(1) (2018) (“[B]efore publishing proposed regulations in
the Federal Register, the Secretary shall prepare draft regulations implementing this title [i.e.,
Title IV of the Higher Education Act] and shall submit such regulations to a negotiated
rulemaking process.”). It is not clear whether negotiated rulemaking increases or decreases the
burden imposed by notice and comment. See, e.g., David Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory
Capture, 80 WASH. L. REV. 329, 338 (2014) (“Scholars are split over whether the consensual
regulatory responses, such as negotiated rulemaking, were ever effective in addressing the
problems of the 1980s.”).
155. See infra notes 159–63 and accompanying text.
156. Such considerations include the flexibility of acting through guidance and the
potentially better engagement resulting from notice-and-comment rulemaking. See infra
Section III.C.5.
157. See supra Section II.B.1.
158. 34 C.F.R. § 674.49(c)(5)(i) (2019).
159. See infra Section III.C.
160. See infra Section III.B.4.
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third of the loan balance.161 It seemingly leaves no room for non-undue-hardship
grounds for discharge.
To advance the purposes of the student loan programs, the Department should
engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking and repeal the Perkins program’s “shall
oppose” requirement.162 The Department should also reverse its guidance applying
that requirement to the other two programs.163 Indeed, the Department should take
the latter step even if it determines that notice-and-comment rulemaking for the
relatively small164 Perkins program is too burdensome.
C. On Predictable Rules
The Department’s regulations in many cases reserve broad—in some cases,
unlimited—discretion to loan holders in deciding whether to consent to discharge.165
FFELP guaranty agencies in particular gained steadily more discretion as the
regulations evolved.166 Although the 2015 Dear Colleague Letter structures the
exercise of discretion,167 considerable scope remains for nontransparent,
unpredictable decision making.
1. The Rules Have Reserved Broad, Unpredictably Exercised Discretion to Loan
Holders
The gaps in the regulations described above may confer discretion on loan
holders. Because there are no explicit instructions about what to do if undue hardship
is present,168 perhaps the regulations permit holders to decide for themselves what to
do in this circumstance. For federally held loans, including loans under the giant Ford
program, there are no regulations, so the Department may have retained discretion in
all circumstances. Indeed, in 1985, the Secretary announced the intention to “exercise
the full discretion accorded” under the statute to decide “on a case-by-case basis”
whether to pursue collection of loans the Department holds.169 The Secretary has
since given more concrete guidance in the 2015 Dear Colleague Letter, as described
in Section II.B.
In addition to any scope for discretion to be found in the regulatory gaps, the
regulations affirmatively confer discretion in some areas. Indeed, the FFEL
regulations have continually changed to give guaranty agencies more and more
discretion. In 1986, the regulations provided that the guaranty agency “shall

161. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
163. See supra Section II.B.1.
164. As of the end of the first quarter of 2020, the $5.9 billion in Perkins loans outstanding
accounted for less than 0.4% of the federal student loan portfolio. See U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
supra note 53.
165. See infra Section II.C.1.
166. See infra notes 170–73 and accompanying text.
167. See supra Section II.B.1.
168. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text.
169. 1985 GSL PLUS NPRM, supra note 104, at 35,966.
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diligently contest” discharge.170 In 1992, the Department amended the regulations so
that they affirmatively instructed the guaranty agency to oppose discharge only
where undue hardship was absent and opposition was cost-effective.171 The rules
were silent as to what to do in other cases.
In 1999, the Department removed any remaining affirmative requirement to
oppose discharge,172 leaving it unclear what the guaranty agency was supposed to do
under any outcome of the analysis it was to perform. In 2001, the Department
partially filled this gap with an affirmative grant of discretion. It provided that if
undue hardship was absent but discharge opposition was cost-ineffective, the
guaranty “may, but need not” oppose discharge.173 Thus, the FFEL regulations
evolved from providing direction in all circumstances to affirmatively granting
discretion in one circumstance and being silent in all others.
As discussed, the 2015 Dear Colleague Letter probably prescribes that holders
should not oppose discharge when undue hardship is present.174 When undue
hardship is absent, the letter requires holders to oppose discharge if the costs of doing
so are less than one-third of the amount outstanding on the loan and provides that
holders “may” oppose discharge if the costs of doing so are above the one-third
threshold.175 The letter thus cabins holders’ discretion somewhat by filling the
outright gaps in the regulations, although it does so only as a guidance document.
However, the 2015 Dear Colleague Letter does not, and cannot,176 supersede the
FFEL regulations’ affirmative grant of discretion in one important scenario: where
undue hardship is absent but opposing discharge is cost-ineffective. Indeed, the letter
extends the grant of discretion in this case beyond the FFEL program. Under the
letter, Perkins and Ford loan holders enjoy the same flexibility that the regulations
confer on FFEL holders.177
Perhaps more importantly, the decisions the letter and regulations require holders
to make involve discretion and are not transparent to borrowers. As the letter points
out, the undue hardship determinations the letter requires in its first step of analysis178
“often are difficult and require the exercise of judgment by the holder.”179 In the
second step, the letter requires estimates of litigation cost,180 which are themselves

170. 1986 GSL PLUS Final Regulations, supra note 100, at 40,905.
171. 1992 FFEL Rules, supra note 101, at 60,349.
172. See 1999 FFEL Ford Final Rules, supra note 102, at 58,960–61 (omitting any
requirement to do anything in particular based on outcome of two-step analysis). As discussed,
the guaranty agency may have been under an unqualified duty to use due diligence to oppose
discharge at this point, but that reading is probably incorrect. See supra Section II.B.1
173. 2001 FFEL Ford Final Rules, supra note 103, at 34,762.
174. See supra Section II.B.1.
175. See supra Section I.C.
176. A guidance document may not amend regulations adopted through notice-andcomment rulemaking. “[A]n amendment to a legislative rule must itself be legislative.” Am.
Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(quoting Nat’l Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass’n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 235 (D.C.
Cir. 1992)).
177. 2015 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 22, at 3–4.
178. See supra Section I.C.
179. 2015 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 22, at 4.
180. See supra Section I.C.
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subjective and debatable. Thus, holders continue to enjoy a great deal of freedom of
action, and borrowers have correspondingly little concrete guidance.
2. The Department Should Alleviate Borrower Uncertainty by Creating Safe
Harbors
The Bankruptcy Code’s undue-hardship provision reflects a view—well-founded
or not—that some debtors do not deserve bankruptcy’s fresh start.181 However, as
Professors Rafael Pardo and Michelle Lacey demonstrated in a study published in
2009,182 the provision impinges on the debtor’s fresh start and access to justice in a
way that goes beyond what underlying policy justifies.183 It does so with respect to
both substance and procedure: courts apply the undue-hardship standard
inconsistently and because litigating undue hardship is costly.184 By adopting
judicially defined undue hardship as the sole substantive basis for consent to
discharge, the Department seemingly imports into its decisions the geographic
inconsistency of judicial opinions in this area.185 The Department could go a long
way toward remedying both the substantive and the procedural problems by adopting
“safe harbors,” that is, objectively defining classes of debtors whose claims of
dischargeability the Department will not contest.
The substantive problem Pardo and Lacey mention is that the undue-hardship
standard is applied inconsistently, so that the litigation process produces “noise rather
than clarity.”186 It is notoriously difficult to predict how a bankruptcy court will rule
in an undue-hardship proceeding.187 The unpredictability of success could cause a
decrease in the likelihood of settlement, increasing the likelihood that creditors use
superior resources to wear debtors down in a “war of attrition.”188 It could make
debtors less likely to press valid claims for relief because success is uncertain.189 And
theoretically it could also make debtors more likely to press invalid claims because
failure is uncertain.

181. See Hunt, supra note 122, at 1302–07 (demonstrating Section 523(a)(8)’s origin in
concerns that some student borrowers were abusing the system).
182. Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 50.
183. See id. at 182–83. Pardo and Lacey had previously demonstrated empirically that the
substantive standard is inconsistently applied. See Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship in the
Bankruptcy Courts, supra note 9, at 479–80.
184. See Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 50, at 183.
185. See 2015 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 22, at 3 (noting adoption of different tests
for undue hardship in different judicial circuits).
186. See Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 50, at 190.
187. See Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts, supra note 9, at 479–
80 (“[W]hat has proven to be most troublesome regarding application of the law has not been
the infrequency with which relief has been granted, but rather the haphazard fashion in which
courts have determined whether a debtor’s circumstances support a claim of undue hardship
that warrants forgiveness of educational debt.”).
188. See Pardo, The Undue Hardship Thicket, supra note 8, at 2109–10, 2146.
189. Compare Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 50, at 191
(“[I]nconsistency of the doctrine gives . . . creditors room to maneuver and argue that a debtor
should not prevail . . . . Perhaps, then, some of the most sympathetic cases of undue hardship
fail to wend their way through the court system.”).
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Although one familiar with law’s rules-standards debate might be inclined to
dismiss the unpredictability as a necessary cost of making a nuanced, contextsensitive determination of undue hardship,190 Pardo and Lacey’s study suggests that
the uncertainty here is pernicious: factors other than the merits of the debtor’s case
drive outcomes.191 A borrower might get some guidance from a lawyer’s or the
borrower’s own legal research on the peculiarities of the relevant jurisdiction.
However, financially strapped debtors may lack the money to fund legal research,
which in any event might not be illuminating.
That lack of money is relevant to the procedural problem Pardo and Lacey
identify, which is that it is expensive and difficult to seek an undue-hardship
discharge. The borrower must bring an adversary proceeding192—essentially a
separate civil action within the bankruptcy193—in order to find out if the unduehardship claim will prevail. In such a proceeding, the borrower bears both the burden
of proof of undue hardship194 and the cost of funding the action.195 Financially
distressed debtors may not be able to finance the effort.196

190. On the rules-standards debate, see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992).
191. See, e.g., Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts, supra note 9, at
480 (“[W]hat has proved to be most troublesome regarding application of the law has not been
the infrequency with which relief has been granted, but rather the haphazard fashion in which
courts have determined whether a debtor’s circumstances support a claim of undue
hardship.”). In a subsequent study, Pardo and Lacey found that “the identity of the judge
assigned to the adversary proceeding is associated with the extent of discharge,” highlighting
the ex ante unpredictability of the undue-hardship standard. Pardo & Lacey, The Real StudentLoan Scandal, supra note 50, at 234.
192. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(6) (“The following are adversary proceedings . . . (6) a
proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a debt.”); United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v.
Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 272 (2010) (referring to “the requirement that a bankruptcy court
make this finding [i.e., a finding of undue hardship] in an adversary proceeding”).
193. See 6A BANKRUPTCY SERVICE LAWYER’S EDITION § 57:11 (2018) (“[A]n ‘adversary
proceeding’ is essentially indistinguishable from a civil action . . . .”).
194. See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 925 F.2d 1580, 1583 (7th Cir. 1991). The creditor
bears the initial burden of establishing that the debt exists and is covered by the undue-hardship
provision. The burden then shifts to the debtor to demonstrate undue hardship. See Pardo, The
Undue Hardship Thicket, supra note 8, at 2110. Pardo argues that under prevailing doctrine,
the creditor has a “much easier evidentiary showing.” Id. at 2113. See generally id. at
2113–21.
195. See Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 50, at 183 (“Debtors
who have filed for bankruptcy in the first instance as a result of financial distress must
somehow find the resources to litigate a full-blown lawsuit in order to prove that their
predicament qualifies them for relief from their student loans.”).
196. See Pardo, The Undue Hardship Thicket, supra note 8, at 2112 (“[T]he consumer
bankruptcy bar has emphasized that many debtors do not have the financial wherewithal to
litigate an undue hardship adversary proceeding.”); Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan
Scandal, supra note 50, at 186 (“A debtor who has filed for bankruptcy as a result of financial
distress generally will not be well positioned to expend resources to litigate a dispute relating
to his or her prebankruptcy debts.”).
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The Department could alleviate the uncertainty facing borrowers by clearly
stating certain circumstances under which it will oppose or not oppose discharge.
Currently, however, it misses this opportunity. The rules specified in the 2015 Dear
Colleague Letter track the judicial interpretations of the undue-hardship standard and
thus incorporate the unpredictability those interpretations create.197 Moreover, as
discussed, they confer broad, nontransparently exercised discretion on holders. 198
To reduce the uncertainty arising from inconsistent judicial application of the
undue-hardship standard, the Department could create “safe harbors,” “exposed
outcroppings,”199 or both. A safe harbor would be a set of circumstances in which
the loan holder will not oppose discharge. An “exposed outcropping” would be a set
of circumstances in which the loan holder definitely will oppose discharge. The term
is the author’s effort to coin an opposite to “safe harbors.”
As between safe harbors and exposed outcroppings, safe harbors are probably
more urgently needed because meritorious claims of undue hardship that are not
asserted are probably a bigger problem than meritless claims that are asserted. The
fact that as few as 0.187% of bankrupt student loan debtors seek relief, combined
with a success rate that may be well over 50% when borrowers do seek relief,200
strongly suggests that borrowers with meritorious claims are not bringing them. In
defending the student loan nondischargeability provision in 1978, Representative
John Erlenborn of Illinois responded to what he called the “very persuasive”
argument of Representative Caldwell Butler of Virginia that some students would
need bankruptcy.201 Erlenborn argued, “[I]f there is true hardship, the loan can be
discharged.”202 Erlenborn’s promise seems empty if only 0.187%203 of bankrupt
student loan debtors even try to discharge their loans.
A safe harbor seems likely to induce debtors to assert claims of undue hardship
that they otherwise would not pursue because they would not face uncertainty and
expense for pursuing an undue-hardship claim within the safe harbor.204 Assuming
that the safe harbors would be designed so that the claims they cover are
predominantly meritorious ones, inducing debtors to use the safe harbors would be a
good thing.205
Moreover, establishing a safe-harbor rule may lead to better decisions about
which debtor claims of undue hardship to oppose. Because the Department would

197. See 2015 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 22, at 1–2 (“[A] holder must . . . determine
whether . . . repayment would constitute an undue hardship according to the legal standards
set by the Federal courts.”).
198. See supra Section II.C.1.
199. The author, unable to find a term for the opposite of “safe harbor,” offers this one.
200. See supra Section II.A.2.
201. 124 CONG. REC. 1797 (1978) (statement of Rep. Butler).
202. Id. (statement of Rep. Erlenborn).
203. See supra note 119.
204. See Jiménez et al., supra note 16, at 115 (“The dual aims of our clear-cut [safe-harbor]
procedures are to encourage individuals suffering undue hardship to seek a discharge and to
avoid the need for an attorney.”).
205. Conversely, to the extent debtors are currently initiating meritless undue-hardship
proceedings because they are hoping not to be opposed, an “exposed outcropping” might deter
that practice.
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craft the safe harbors outside the adversarial context of bankruptcy litigation, it
would avoid certain factors that might motivate holders to fight discharge even where
it is warranted. Such factors include the desire of Justice Department lawyers to notch
wins in cases they litigate206 and the inclination, suggested by Pardo and Lacey, of
more powerful creditors to wage “wars of attrition,” rather than seeming to acquiesce
when challenged.207
The BFGJO group has proposed just such a safe-harbor rule, suggesting that the
Department consent to discharge in nine specifically defined sets of circumstances.208
For example, the Department would not oppose discharge if the borrower’s income
is currently below 150% of the poverty level and the borrower receives Social
Security disability benefits,209 or if the borrower has had an income below the federal
poverty level for the last four years.210 This author supports the BFGJO group’s
proposal and notes that additional safe harbors may also be justified. For example, a
companion article considers whether and when the Department should consent to
discharge for debtors whose debt-to-income ratio exceeds a prescribed level.211
The Department’s website currently states that the Department does not provide
“specific guidance related to settlements and compromises” because providing such
information “is not in the best interest of the government as it could enable borrowers
to reduce their repayments below the amount they can legitimately afford.”212 This
Article argues against a purely pecuniary definition of the government’s interest
when it comes to student loan repayment.213 Moreover, the concern expressed on the
website may not apply to many suggestions to provide borrowers guidance regarding
bankruptcy. For example, take the just-mentioned BFGJO group proposal. It seems
unlikely that the prospect of a bankruptcy discharge will induce many people to live
in poverty for four years or reduce their income to less than 150% of the poverty
level and become disabled.
Although objectively defined safe harbors should be an important part of
Department discharge consent policy, they should not be the only grounds for
consent. The goals of the student loan programs and Bankruptcy Code may require
the Department to consider circumstances that do not easily lend themselves to
objective definition and easy documentation. For example, a companion paper argues
that a borrower should not be barred from getting a discharge just because the
borrower could leave lower-paid work using their education for higher-paid work

206. See Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control
of Federal Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558, 588 (2003).
207. See Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 50, at 191–92.
208. See Bruckner et al., supra note 18, at 190–91; Jiménez et al., supra note 16, at 115.
209. See Bruckner et al., supra note 18, at 190–91; Jiménez et al., supra note 16, at 115
(describing similar proposal based on eligibility for, rather than receipt of, benefits).
210. See Bruckner et al., supra note 18, at 190; Jiménez et al., supra note 16, at 115
(describing similar proposal based on five years of living in poverty).
211. See Hunt, supra note 33, at 775–78.
212. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Loan Servicing and Collection—Frequently Asked Questions,
SETC-Q1, FED. STUDENT AID, https://ifap.ed.gov/loan-servicing-and-collection-freque ntlyasked-questions#SETC-Q1 [https://perma.cc/EG6L-NBQC].
213. See infra Section III.B.1.
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that does not use the education.214 This circumstance may not be proven as
conclusively with standard documents as income and disability eligibility, but the
Department should be willing to consider it in deciding whether to consent to
discharge.
The Department could implement safe harbors in different ways. The BFGJO
group has suggested that the Department do so through creating a rebuttable
presumption of undue hardship in certain circumstances.215 This Article suggests
adding grounds for consent to discharge other than undue hardship, as described in
the Part III.
III. “SUBSTANTIVE” OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: LIBERALIZING
DISCHARGE CONSENT POLICY
Part III offers observations and recommendations that go to the heart of the
Department’s discharge policy: they address how freely the Department should
consent to discharge. The Department has treated discharge consent largely, if not
entirely, as a problem of debt collection.216 That should change. The Department’s
policy should reflect the fact that the Department is running an educational benefit
program, not a bank. The discharge consent rules should reflect statutory purposes
of the student loan program that go beyond debt collection. The Department can and
should further these purposes by consenting to discharge on bases other than undue
hardship.
A. The Rules Have Treated Consent to Discharge as a Debt Collection Issue
The underlying goal of the Department’s bankruptcy discharge opposition policy
to date appears to have been cost-effective collection of loans. The 2015 Dear
Colleague Letter seems to instruct holders to oppose discharge whenever it is costeffective to do so, unless the holder reaches the “clear conclusion” that repayment
would work undue hardship.217
The explanations the Department has given for its discharge opposition
regulations, scant as they are, focus on pecuniary considerations. The 1987 Perkins
rules, which contain the closest thing to an explanation of the Department’s
bankruptcy-discharge policy to be found in the regulatory history, mention “the
weight to be given to the cost of litigation”218 and justify the decision to regulate
discharge opposition on the ground that institutions were permitted “to charge to the
[Perkins] Fund the costs of the litigation required in bankruptcy.”219 Other aspects of
the regulatory history evidence a policy in favor of collection where it is costeffective, although this is expressed obliquely.220

214. See Hunt, supra note 33, at 773–75.
215. See Bruckner et al., supra note 18, at 244; Jiménez et al., supra note 16, at 115.
216. See infra Section III.A.
217. 2015 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 22, at 10–11.
218. 1987 Perkins Rules, supra note 97, at 45,555.
219. Id.
220. The 1990 GSL NPRM references a policy of “reduc[ing] defaults and increas[ing]
collections on loans that do go into default.” 1990 GSL NPRM, supra note 112, at 48,324.
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The Department apparently has treated undue hardship as a constraint on its
ability to collect, rather than as something to be avoided for its own sake. The 2015
Dear Colleague Letter instructs holders to consent to discharge where undue hardship
is “clear[ly]” present.221 And despite language about “balanc[ing]” collection and
undue hardship,222 the letter states that the decision whether undue hardship is present
“would necessarily” be made according to the standards the judiciary has devised for
proving undue hardship in court.223 In other words, the letter instructs holders to
consent to discharge based on undue hardship only when they clearly would lose in
court anyway.
B. The Department Should Advance the Goals of the Student Loan Programs by
Adopting a More Generous Discharge Consent Policy
Section III.B.1 argues that the Department should take account of all relevant
purposes of the student loan programs in setting discharge policy. Section III.B.2
argues that the Department has failed to do that because it has adopted “undue
hardship,” as defined by the courts, as the sole substantive basis for consent to
discharge.
Sections III.B.3 and III.B.4 consider how the Department could go about
liberalizing its policy. Section III.B.3 considers the possibility that the Department
could act by adopting a broader definition of “undue hardship,” and concludes that
that is a risky path. Section III.B.4 argues that the Department should consider
providing for consent to discharge on bases other than “undue hardship,” and gives
three examples of possible bases the Department could add.
1. The Department Should Take Account of All Relevant Purposes of the Student
Loan Programs in Setting Discharge Policy
To be sure, debt collection in general and nondischargeability in particular serve
goals Congress specifically articulated: protecting the loan programs from financial

This formulation that may have been intended to embrace borrower bankruptcies, although
these apparently generally are not defaults. See supra Section II.A.1. A policy in favor of debt
collection may be implicit in the regulations themselves. The Perkins regulations provide that
the institution “shall oppose discharge” if undue hardship is absent and collection costs are
less than one-third of the loan balance. 34 C.F.R. § 674.49(c)(5)(i) (2019). The FFEL
regulations do not have a comparable bankruptcy-specific provision, but they do provide that
the guaranty agency must use due diligence up until discharge in order to receive payment on
its claim against the government resulting from discharge. See id. § 682.402(k)(2)(v); see also
id. § 674.41(a) (stating that, in Perkins program, institution is to “exercise due diligence in
collecting loans”).
221. See 2015 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 22, at 11.
222. Id. at 1 (explaining that holders must “balance their obligation to collect debts with
judging whether the repayment of loans would constitute an undue hardship to borrowers in
the bankruptcy discharge process”); see also id. at 10 (stating that letter is “to assist loan
holders in fulfilling their regulatory duty to protect the integrity of taxpayer dollars provided
through student loans while consenting to and/or not opposing the undue hardship discharge
petition of a student loan borrower where appropriate”).
223. See id. at 3.
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loss and combating borrower bad faith.224 But the student loan program has other
purposes as well. They include promoting access to higher education regardless of
wealth,225 providing students freedom in choosing careers,226 producing an educated
population for the benefit of the country,227 and benefiting students.228 Scholars have
noted some of these objectives.229
As developed more fully in a companion paper,230 broad nondischargeability of
student debt can interfere with accomplishing all of the goals just mentioned.
Economically disadvantaged students who do not pursue higher education for fear of

224. See Hunt, supra note 122, at 1310–11 (discussing purposes of student-loan
nondischargeability).
225. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Special Comm. on Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. &
Labor on H.R. 3220, 89th Cong. 48 (1965) (testimony of Francis Keppel, Comm’r of
Education, Dep’t of Health, Educ., & Welfare) (“On the question of priorities . . . the first
order of business . . . is to assure the opportunity for the children from families with low
incomes to go on to higher education. That is Priority No. 1.”).
226. See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. H. 7,554 (2007) (statement of Rep. Miller) (stating that
changes to student-loan program “say[] to those individuals who are fully qualified to go to
college, we will not deny you access . . . to the career of your choice[] . . . because you can’t
afford to pay for it”).
227. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 89-673, as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4027, 4053 (1965)
(identifying as reasons for Title IV the “continuing shortage of trained, educated persons in
many areas” and the “present and future shortage of competent, well-trained professional and
technical personnel[]”).
228. See, e.g., Lyndon B. Johnson, Recorded Remarks on the Message on Education,
AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Jan. 12, 1965), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu
/documents/recorded-remarks-the-message-education [https://perma.cc/L8FL-SSCQ]
(“Every child must be encouraged to get as much education as he has the ability to take. We
want this for his sake, and we want this for the country’s sake.”).
229. Professor Abbye Atkinson has found that the legislative history of the programs
indicates that the programs’ goals include making education financially accessible and
benefiting the country through educating the population. See Atkinson, supra note 32, at 12–
13. She also argues that student-loan policy should not, in a way that tracks racial or
socioeconomic differences, discourage people from pursuing careers requiring education. Id.
at 25. Professor Jonathan Glater has emphasized that “[i]n the 1960s, lawmakers sought to
promote access to higher education for an unprecedented number of young Americans.”
Jonathan D. Glater, The Other Big Test: Why Congress Should Allow College Students to
Borrow More Through Federal Aid Programs, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 11, 36
(2011); see also id. at 35–38 (substantiating Glater’s claim about access). Professor Michael
Simkovic has asserted that “government support for higher education has primarily been
driven by economic considerations, particularly during the mid-twentieth century when
Federal Student Loan programs were established.” Michael Simkovic, Risk-Based Student
Loans, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527, 531 (2013). Atkinson’s and Glater’s work call this
assertion into question. Notably, Simkovic acknowledges that “in approving subsequent [i.e.,
post-1958] federal student loan programs, such as the guaranteed loan program established by
the Higher Education Act of 1965, Congress emphasized the need for greater equality of
opportunity and social mobility as well as the need for a skilled labor force.” Id. at 550. A
companion article by this author discusses the purposes of the Higher Education Act more
fully. See Hunt, supra note 33, at 732–42.
230. See Hunt, supra note 33, at 742–62.
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taking on nondischargeable debt do not have equal access to education.231 A graduate
who does not embark on a lower-paying but valuable career because of fear of
nondischargeability does not have free career choice.232 Graduates who cannot work
in the fields for which they have been trained because their debt is nondischargeable
are not fully using their learning for the good of the nation.233 And loans may harm,
rather than help, borrowers who cannot find work after leaving higher education and
suffer hardship that is not “undue” under prevailing judicial interpretations.234 Thus,
to respect all purposes of the student loan programs, policy must balance how
nondischargeability frustrates some goals of the student loan programs even as it
advances others.
The Department should balance the dischargeability-favoring and
dischargeability-disfavoring goals of the programs in regulating, for its charge is to
regulate to advance the purposes—plural—of the federal student loan programs. For
the FFELP, Congress was quite explicit in expressing this intention. The Higher
Education Act provides that the Secretary may issue “such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of this part,”235 referring to the part of the Act
that authorizes the FFELP. Similarly, the Department issued the critical 1987
Perkins regulations under a provision instructing it to act “to promote the purposes”
of the program.236 Although there is no directly parallel provision for the Ford

231. See Rick Seltzer, Antidote to Med Student Debt, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 17, 2018),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/08/17/nyu-scholarships-cover-medical-schooltuition-doctors-debt-continues-raise-concern [https://perma.cc/2HWD-6Z5Q] (“High costs
have for years stoked concerns about how debt affects aspiring doctors. Leaders worry some
of the best and the brightest students, particularly those from poor and immigrant communities,
are dissuaded from attending medical school at all.”). Although the reference here is to debt
in general rather than to nondischargeability, other scholars have posited that
nondischargeability might discourage students from pursuing higher education. See Atkinson,
supra note 32, at 1, 12 (“For potential borrowers, this burden [i.e., the burden of
nondischargeable debt] may deter members of this group from seeking an education if, in
doing so, they must make themselves more vulnerable financially.”).
232. See Jesse Rothstein & Cecilia Elena Rouse, Constrained After College: Student Loans
and Early-Career Occupational Choices, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 149, 149 (2011) (“[D]ebt causes
graduates to choose substantially higher-salary jobs and reduces the probability that students
choose low-paid ‘public interest’ jobs.”). Again, the connection is to debt generally, but it is
reasonable to suppose that nondischargeability stokes debt fears.
233. See Dep’t of Educ. v. Gerhardt (In re Gerhardt), 348 F.3d 89, 93 (5th Cir. 2006)
(“[N]othing in the Bankruptcy Code suggests that a debtor may choose to work only in the
field in which he was trained, obtain a low-paying job, and then claim that it would be an
undue hardship to repay his student loans.”).
234. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 46 B.R. 752, 753
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff‘d, Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d
Cir. 1987) (“The existence of the adjective ‘undue’ indicates that Congress viewed gardenvariety hardship as insufficient excuse for a discharge of student loans . . . .”).
235. 20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(1) (2018).
236. See 1987 Perkins Rules, supra note 97, at 45,561 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 424 as basis for
rules). Section 424 of the Education Code is the codification of Section 204 of the National
Defense Education Act. Compare National Defense Education Act (NDEA), Pub. L. 85-864,
§ 204, 72 Stat. 1580, 1584 (1958) (codified at 20 U.S.C § 424 (2012)), with Pub. L. 88-665, §
204, 78 Stat. 1100, 1101 (1964). Section 204 in turn directs the Secretary to “include such
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program instructing the Secretary to regulate to promote statutory purposes, it would
be strange if Congress intended the Secretary to regulate in light of all the purposes
of the FFELP and Perkins programs, but not those of the Ford program.
Other provisions direct the Secretary to regulate specific aspects of the FFELP
federal insurance program,237 FFELP guaranty-agency program,238 Perkins
program,239 and Ford program240 according to the overall purposes of those
programs. The District Court for the District of Columbia recently upheld the
Department’s gainful-employment rule for institutional eligibility for student loan
funds, in part because the rule “advance[d] the purposes of . . . the Higher Education
Act and Title IV.”241
More generally, administrative agencies are to advance statutory purpose, where
the purpose is discernible. As the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit recently held,
the courts owe deference to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute “if it

other provisions as may be necessary to protect the financial interest of the United States and
promote the purposes of this title.” NDEA, § 204(5), 72 Stat. at 1584.
237. See 20 U.S.C. § 1075(a)(1)(B) (2018) (Secretary can create exceptions to statutory
loan limits if she “determines, pursuant to regulations, that a higher amount is warranted in
order to carry out the purposes of this part”); id. § 1082(a)(3) (regulating as “Secretary
determines to be necessary to assure that the purposes of this part will be achieved”); id. §
1079(b)(1) (Secretary may grant lender comprehensive insurance coverage certificate under
“[s]uch requirements . . . as in the Secretary’s judgment will best achieve the purpose of this
subsection while protecting the United States from the risk of unreasonable loss and promoting
the objectives of this part”).
238. See id. § 1078(a)(3)(A)(v) (2012) (Secretary may make certain payments if state law
“threatens to impede the carrying out of the functions of this part”); id. § 1078(b)(2)(B)
(program agreement to “include such other provisions as may be necessary to protect the
United States from the risk of unreasonable loss and promote the purposes of this part”); id. §
1078(c)(2)(I) (program agreements “may include such other provisions as may be necessary
to promote the purpose of this part”); id. § 1078-1(b)(2)(A)(viii) (program agreements may
include reporting requirements “as the Secretary may require to carry out the purposes of the
programs under this title”); id. § 1078-1(b)(2)(G) (program agreements may include “such
. . . provisions as the Secretary may determine to be necessary to protect the United States
from the risk of unreasonable loss and to promote the purposes of this part”); id. § 10788(d)(2)(A) (permissible exception to loan limits “where the Secretary determines that a higher
amount is warranted in order to carry out the purpose of this part”).
239. See id. § 1087cc(a)(1) (agreement with institution under Perkins program “shall
provide for the establishment and maintenance of a student loan fund for the purposes of this
part”).
240. See id. § 1087c(b)(2)(F) (institution may be approved to originate Ford loans only if
it meets “such . . . criteria as the Secretary may establish to protect the financial interest of the
United States and to promote the purposes of this part.”); id. § 1087d(a)(6) (Ford program
participation agreement shall “include such . . . provisions as the Secretary determines are
necessary to protect the interests of the United States and to promote the purposes of this
part”); id. § 1087f(a)(2) (giving special consideration to certain state agencies in awarding
servicing contracts “to the extent practicable and consistent with the purposes of this part”).
241. Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d 176, 199 (D.D.C.
2015), aff'd, 640 F. App’x 5 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see also id. at 201 (“[F]ederal law also gives
the Department the power to ‘carry out’ programs like Title IV.”).
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is reasonable and consistent with the statute’s purpose.”242 Courts routinely cite
consistency with statutory purpose as a reason to uphold agency action.243 And
scholars have affirmed that agencies generally should regulate to promote statutory
purpose. Professor Kevin Stack has put it quite forcefully: “The core obligation” of
administrative agencies is to “evaluate alternatives, justify their choices, and act to
further the goals, aims, and principles—the purposes—their authorizing statutes
establish.”244
2. By Specifying Judicially Defined “Undue Hardship” as the Only Substantive
Basis for Discharge, the Department Ignores Critical Purposes of the Loan
Programs
The Department has adopted “undue hardship” as the only ground other than costeffectiveness for consenting to discharge.245 Thus, one could say that undue hardship
is the only substantive ground for consent. The Department has said that the meaning
of this term in its regulations and policies “would necessarily” track the courts’
interpretation of the phrase in section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code.246
The judicial tests for undue hardship upon which the Department relies ignore the
discharge-favoring goals of the student loan programs that were just discussed. The
leading test, the Brunner test, focuses instead on the borrower’s inability to maintain
a minimal standard of living while repaying loans, the likely persistence of that
condition, and the borrower’s good-faith efforts to repay.247 Neither Brunner nor the
appellate decisions that adopt its test considered how a stingy undue-hardship
standard could interfere with achieving the dischargeability-favoring purposes of the

242. UC Health v. NLRB, 803 F.3d 669, 675 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also Atl. City Elec. Co.
v. F.E.R.C., 295 F.3d 1, 8–9 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“The agency’s interpretation of the statute is
entitled to deference only if it is ‘reasonable and consistent with the statute’s purpose.’”
(quoting Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Hawke, 211 F.3d 638, 643 (D.C. Cir. 2000))).
243. See, e.g., Fed. Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402–03 (2008) (upholding
EEOC’s definition of a “charge” on grounds that “the agency’s proposed test implements . . .
the purposes of the [Age Discrimination in Employment] Act”); Catskill Mtns. Chapter of
Trout Unltd. v. EPA, 846 F.3d 492, 524 (2d Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. New York v.
EPA, 138 S. Ct. 1164 (2018) (upholding EPA rule where agency “justified the [r]ule by
reference to statutory purpose”); Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 199 (upholding Department
student-loan rule in part because it “advance[d] the purposes of . . . the Higher Education Act
and Title IV”).
244. Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret
Statutes, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 871, 888 (2015).
245. See supra Section I.C.
246. See 2015 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 22, at 3. It is not clear that this must be
the case. It seems the Department could give “undue hardship” a different meaning in its own
regulations and policies than the phrase has in the statute. However, now that the Department
has taken the position that its regulations track the statutory meaning as interpreted by courts,
it may be difficult to backtrack. See, e.g., Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S.
142, 146 (2012) (refusing to defer to changed agency interpretation of its regulations where
the change created “unfair surprise”).
247. See Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d
Cir. 1987).
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programs.248 The decisions do not address, for example, whether inability to escape
crushing student debts that discourage participation in the economy and society
thwart the purposes of bringing the advantages of an educated population to the
country, helping students, or fostering career choice.
The minority judicial test for undue hardship, the totality-of-the-circumstances
test, is supposedly more expansive than Brunner.249 However, it likewise does not
take account of the statutory purposes discussed in Section III.B.1. Instead, the
“totality” test’s inclusiveness seems to apply to “micro” factors of the individual
debtor’s circumstances, rather than “macro” factors such as the effect of denying
discharge on achieving the overall purposes of the student loan programs.250
The appellate courts have ignored discharge-favoring purposes of the student loan
programs even though they have relied on discharge-disfavoring purposes. Courts
repeatedly have invoked the goal of keeping the student loan programs solvent, a
purpose supposedly advanced by making discharge difficult.251 The Brunner

248. Brunner adopted its test “for the reasons set forth in the district court’s order.” Id. The
district court’s opinion, recognizing that promoting access was an “enlightened social policy,”
did not consider how a high standard for nondischargeability might interfere with access or
other goals of the program. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp (In re Brunner),
46 B.R. 752, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Subsequent decisions applying Brunner cited in the 2015
Dear Colleague Letter have also failed to consider that issue. See Hedlund v. Ed. Res. Inst.
718 F.3d 848, 851 (9th Cir. 2013); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour (In re Frushour),
433 F.3d 393, 399–401 (4th Cir. 2005); Oyler v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Oyler), 397
F.2d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 2004); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1306–10
(10th Cir. 2004); Dep’t of Educ. v. Gerhardt (In re Gerhardt), 348 F.3d 89, 91(5th Cir. 2003);
Hemar Ins. Corp. of Am. v. Cox (In re Cox), 338 F.3d 1238, 1241–42 (11th Cir. 2003); In re
Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1135–37 (7th Cir. 1999); Penn. Higher Educ. Assistance Auth. v.
Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 304–06 (3d Cir. 1995). The letter cites the Hedlund case from
the Ninth Circuit, but that court adopted the Brunner test in In re Pena, 155 F.3d 1108, 1111–
12 (9th Cir. 2001). The court did not discuss nondischargeability’s potential interference with
the overall goals of the student-loan programs in Pena.
249. The “totality of the circumstances” test—as its name suggests—permits consideration
of “the unique facts and circumstances that surround each particular bankruptcy.” Long v.
Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2003). The Eighth Circuit,
the only appellate court to have adopted this test, has described it as “less restrictive” than
Brunner and as preserving the court’s “inherent discretion.” Id. Professor Rafael Pardo found,
in a study of 1430 cases filed in 2011 and 2012, no significant difference in rates of debtor
success based on the legal test used. See Pardo, supra note 120, at 1118, 1141.
250. The “totality” test’s inclusiveness seems to apply to “micro” factors of the individual
debtor’s circumstances, rather than “macro” factors such as the effect of denying discharge on
achieving the overall purposes of the student loan programs. See, e.g., Fern v. FedLoan
Servicing (In re Fern), 563 B.R. 1, 4 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2017) (listing nine factors considered
under the totality-of-the-circumstances test, all having to do with individual characteristics of
the debtor and the debtor’s bankruptcy).
251. See Frushour, 433 F.3d at 400 (stating that “heightened” undue hardship standard
“protects the integrity of the student-loan program and saves it from fiscal doom” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302,
1306 (10th Cir. 2004) (“In enacting § 523(a)(8), Congress was primarily concerned about
abusing student debtors and protecting the solvency of student loan programs.”); Faish, 72
F.3d at 306 (stating that the Brunner test “safeguards the financial integrity of the student loan
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decision itself is based almost entirely on legislative history and the court’s view of
statutory purpose, but the only materials it cites on those points relate to the
nondischargeability provision itself taken in isolation. The decision cites nothing
relating to the purposes of the student loan programs more broadly.252
Courts have ignored overall goals of the student loan programs even though those
goals are relevant to a proper interpretation of the statutory term “undue hardship.”253
Answering the open-ended question what hardship is “undue,” or unjustified,254
requires weighing the creditor’s interest in opposing discharge against the hardship
discharge would avert. That analysis in turn requires considering the overall purposes
of the student loan programs along with the purposes of the nondischargeability
provision, because the statutes in question are related255 and should be interpreted
together to promote the purposes of both enactments.256 The Supreme Court affirmed
this view in considering the Bankruptcy Act together with a related statute. It held
that the proper approach is to take, together with the specific clause at issue, “the
whole statute (or statutes on the same subject) and the objects and policy of the law
. . . and give to it such a construction as will carry into execution the will of the
legislature . . . .”257 Here, the specific clause at issue would be “undue hardship,”
which should be interpreted in light of the purposes of related statutes—that is, the
purposes of the student loan programs.
Courts may have ignored most of the student loan programs’ larger purposes
because judges decide individual cases. A court is relatively well positioned to assess
an individual debtor’s ability to repay and good or bad faith, as the Brunner test
demands.258 But courts are less well situated to evaluate how denying discharge in a

program”).
252. See Brunner, 46 B.R. at 753–56. Brunner does state that its test “plainly serves the
purposes of the guaranteed student loan program[,]” but cites no authority in support of the
assertion. Id. at 756.
253. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2018) (requiring “undue hardship” for discharge of
educational debt).
254. See, e.g., “Undue”, MERRIAMWEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dict
ionary/undue [https://perma.cc/8J59-MXQF] (defining undue as “exceeding or violating
propriety or fitness: excessive”). For further development of the argument that “undue” means
“unjustified,” see Hunt, supra note 33, at 764 n. 269.
255. Given the overlapping subject matter, the student-loan nondischargeability provision
of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2018), seems clearly related to the studentloan provisions of the Higher Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087aa–1087ii (2018) (Perkins);
id. §§ 1071 to 1087-2 (FFELP); id. § 1087a–1087j (Ford). The relationship is all the closer
because the nondischargeability provision has its origin in the 1976 amendments to the Higher
Education Act. See Hunt, supra note 122, at 1302–04.
256. See 2A NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 45:10 (7th ed. 2018) (“[A] full appreciation of any specific enactment
requires an examination of all legislation in a particular field.”); see also id. § 51:1 (“Other
statutes dealing with the same subject as the one being construed, commonly called statutes in
pari materia, are another extrinsic aid useful in questions of interpretation.”).
257. Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974) (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S.
(19 How.) 183, 194 (1857)).
258. See Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d
Cir. 1987).
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particular case thwarts larger program goals. For example, a court can hardly
determine the extent to which denying discharge in the case before it will discourage
other students from pursuing higher education or taking a financial risk on a lowerpaying but important career—both of which are outcomes that would undermine the
purposes of the student loan programs.259 Thus, even though these purposes are
germane to determining what hardship is “undue,” courts seem unlikely to evaluate
them.
Balancing pro-discharge purposes against the need to keep the student loan
programs solvent is a task for which agencies such as the Department are particularly
well suited relative to courts. As Professor Kevin Stack has argued, when interpreting
“statutes with conflicting purposes, or purposes at different levels of generality that
are in tension with one another,”260 agencies “have decisive advantages over courts”
because agencies specialize in the statutes they administer and therefore have
specialized staff, among other reasons.261 The student loan programs exhibit such a
policy tension. As Professor Abbye Atkinson has stated, “[w]ith one hand, Congress
giveth” by encouraging student borrowing, “yet with the other hand Congress taketh
away” by restricting bankruptcy discharge.262
3. It Is Unclear that the Department Could Expand the Definition of “Undue
Hardship”
In light of courts’ limitations in giving effect to all statutory objectives and the
Department’s potential advantage in balancing contending purposes, the question
arises whether the Department could interpret “undue hardship” itself. Perhaps the
Department could adopt an interpretation of the phrase that takes all relevant
purposes into account and would, presumably, be more generous than judicial
interpretations that do not take account of discharge-favoring purposes of the loan
programs. For example, consider the proposal that the Department provide for
consent to discharge when the debtor is living below the poverty level.263 Could the
Department decree that hardship is automatically “undue” in such a case,
disregarding the debtor’s past efforts to repay and thus departing from the Brunner
standard?
The Department has taken the position that “undue hardship,” as it uses the term,
does have the same meaning as “undue hardship” in section 523(a)(8) of the
Bankruptcy Code.264 Thus, the Department has framed the question just posed as one
of authority to interpret that statutory provision.

259. See Hunt, supra note 33, at 74–51.
260. Stack, supra note 244, at 908.
261. Id. at 907.
262. Atkinson, supra note 32, at 22; see also id. at 4 (noting a “tension between two federal
policies with respect to educational attainment”); Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan
Scandal, supra note 50, at 235 (noting “schizophrenia” of combining a “public-oriented
approach to student-loan origination” with a “business-oriented approach to student-loan
collection”).
263. See Bruckner et al., supra note 18, at 190; Jimenez et al., supra note 16, at 115.
264. See supra Section III.B.2.
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Given the intertwined nature of the undue-hardship provision and the Higher
Education Act,265 the Department could argue that both are part of a statutory scheme
it “administers.” It would then seem to follow under Chevron v. Natural Resources
Defense Council that the Department would be authorized to interpret “undue
hardship” and that its interpretation would be entitled to judicial deference.266
Moreover, the Department would even be authorized to overrule contrary judicial
interpretations, as long as the courts have not held that the statute “unambiguously
forecloses” the Department’s interpretation.267
However, it is far from clear that such an effort on the Department’s part would
be successful. The Supreme Court has shown increasing hostility to administrative
interpretation.268 In particular, it has recently declared that authority to administer a
particular statute does not entitle an agency to deference in interpreting a separate
statute arguably touching on the same subject matter.269 This would be an obstacle
to the Department’s claim of authority to interpret section 523(a)(8), as would the
courts’ undisputed role in interpreting the provision.270 Finally, the Department’s
existing disclaimer of authorization to interpret the statutory term “undue
hardship”271 would complicate any effort to take a contrary position now.272
Even if the Department would be justified under existing law in claiming
deference to a new definition of “undue hardship” that it might craft, the law seems
to be developing in a way that does not favor this strategy. Thus, forthrightly

265. See supra Section III.B.2.
266. 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (holding that courts should defer to reasonable agency
interpretation of statute agency administers).
267. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–
83 (2005).
268. See, e.g., Randy J. Kozel, Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Deference, and the
Law of Stare Decisis, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1125, 1152–53 (2019) (describing Supreme Court
Justices’ expressions of skepticism about existing administrative deference doctrines and the
Court’s grant of certiorari to reconsider one such doctrine).
269. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1629 (2018) (demonstrating a conflict
where the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) both
arguably addressed whether employers could require employees to enter into arbitration
agreements with class waivers, the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) interpretation
of the FAA was not entitled to deference although the NLRB unquestionably administered the
NLRA).
270. See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649–50 (1990) (refusing to defer to
administrative interpretation where “Congress has expressly established the judiciary and not
[the agency] as the adjudicator”); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 177 (1990) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (“The law in question, a criminal statute, is not administered by the agency but
by the courts.”).
271. See 2015 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 22, at 3 (“Congress has never defined
‘undue hardship’ in the Bankruptcy Code and has not delegated to the Department the
authority to do so.”).
272. See, e.g., Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417 (1993) (“An agency
interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency’s earlier interpretation
is entitled to considerably less deference than a consistently held agency view.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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adopting grounds for consent other than undue hardship273 or adopting a rebuttable
presumption of undue hardship in certain circumstances274 would seem to be surer
paths to liberalizing bankruptcy discharge consent policy than broadening the
definition of undue hardship.
4. The Department Should Act to Promote the Programs’ Purposes by Adopting
Additional Bases for Consent to Discharge
Unguided by statutory purposes that counsel mercy, some courts have applied
Brunner quite harshly, requiring a “certainty of hopelessness” as a prerequisite for
relief.275 Even where the courts are not so stern as that, their tests focus on the
borrower’s previous efforts to repay,276 even in situations where the overall purposes
of the student loan programs would favor consent to discharge regardless of
borrower’s repayment efforts. By recognizing grounds for consent to discharge other
than undue hardship, the Department can promote the goals of the student loan
programs and alleviate harshness at the same time.
For example, take one of the bright-line discharge-consent rules that the BFGJO
group has proposed. They recommend that the Department not oppose discharge for
low-income debtors who did not receive a degree from the program they attended.277
Although the Department could adopt a rebuttable presumption of undue hardship in
this circumstance as those authors suggest, it could also decide to consent to
discharge based on the purposes of the student loan programs. Specifically, opposing
discharge in such cases might discourage others from pursuing higher education or
preserve student loans that are likely to have harmed students rather than benefiting
them. Each of those outcomes would thwart the goals of the student loan programs.278
As another example, this author suggests elsewhere that borrower discouragement
could be recognized as a basis for discharge.279 Bankruptcy law generally recognizes

273. See infra Section III.B.4.
274. See Bruckner et al., supra note 18, at 244; Jiménez et al., supra note 16, at 115. The
considerations identified in this paragraph apparently would not apply to the Department’s
decision to adopt a rebuttable presumption that certain circumstances amount to undue
hardship. The Department in that case would not be advancing its own interpretation of the
term but rather finding that particular fact patterns indicate that the relevant existing definition
is fulfilled.
275. See Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 794 F.3d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 2015); Spence
v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Spence), 541 F.3d 538, 544 (4th Cir. 2008); Barrett v.
Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Barrett), 487 F.3d 353, 359 (6th Cir. 2007); Educ. Credit
Mgmt. Corp. v. Mosley (In re Mosley), 494 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007); Brightful v. Pa.
Higher Educ. Assistance Auth. (In re Brightful), 267 F.3d 324, 328 (3d Cir. 2001).
276. See Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir.
1987) (stating that an element of Brunner test is that debtor “has made” good-faith efforts at
repayment); Fern v. FedLoan Servicing (In re Fern), 563 B.R. 1, 4 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2017)
(holding that “whether the debtor has made payments on the student loan” is a factor in totalityof-the-circumstances test).
277. See Bruckner et al., supra note 18, at 190; Jiménez et al., supra note 16, at 115
(making similar proposal).
278. See Hunt, supra note 33, at 743–47, 758–62.
279. See id. at 775–78.
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that unmanageable debt induces borrowers to give up in frustration and withdraw
from participation in the economy and society.280 Using discharge to remedy such
discouragement could advance the goals of the student loan programs. That is
because discouraged borrowers are not providing society the benefit of their
education, are not pursuing their career of choice, and quite likely have been harmed,
rather than helped, by their loans.281
Borrower discouragement may be difficult to measure directly. However, a high
debt-to-income ratio is a promising proxy for discouragement.282 The debt-to-income
ratio can be calculated based on information in the debtor’s bankruptcy petition.283
Although more research on the connection between debt-income ratio and worker
discouragement is needed,284 the ratio could be an administrable criterion for consent
on the ground of debtor discouragement.
It is possible that a discouraged borrower is also suffering undue hardship. But
that is far from certain. Consider an analysis under the leading test, the one articulated
in Brunner.285 A borrower who has given up on work because of insurmountable
student debt may well have a sub-“minimal” standard of living,286 and it may be the
case that the situation will persist for a significant portion of the repayment period.287
Moreover, the borrower’s past efforts to repay may rise to the level of “good faith”
and therefore satisfy the third element of the test.288 But even if a discouraged
borrower enjoys an above-minimal standard of living (perhaps because of family
resources) or has made insufficient past efforts to repay to satisfy the prevailing
interpretation of “good-faith effort,”289 the borrower is still discouraged. And that

280. See id. at 753–58.
281. See id. at 753.
282. See id. at 775–78.
283. Income documents that must be filed with a Chapter 7 petition include (1) a schedule
of current income and expenditures, see 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2018); FED. R. BANKR.
P. 1007(b)(1)(B); (2) a statement of monthly net income, see 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(v)
(2018); and (3) a statement of current monthly income, FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(b)(4). On the
debt side, the debtor must file a schedule of assets and liabilities. See 11 U.S.C. §
521(a)(1)(B)(i) (2018); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(b)(1)(A). For a discussion of these
requirements, see 1 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE ¶ 15.03 (2019).
284. See Hunt, supra note 33, at 775–78.
285. See Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir.
1987) (specifying three-element test).
286. Id. (stating that the first element of the Brunner test is that the debtor cannot currently
maintain a minimal standard of living if forced to repay).
287. Id. (stating that the second element of the Brunner test is existence of additional
circumstances indicating that debtor’s inability to maintain a minimal standard of living while
repaying is likely to continue for a significant portion of the repayment period).
288. Id. (stating that the third element of the Brunner test is that the debtor has made goodfaith efforts to repay the loans).
289. Given the Department’s view that undue hardship “necessarily” is evaluated
according to the courts’ interpretation, it would appear that the Department’s standards for
consent to discharge would vary with the different judicial standards used in different
localities. See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 22, at 3, App. B (detailing tests adopted by
judicial circuits). Scholars have documented the wide variation in judicial interpretation of
“undue hardship” from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bruckner et al., supra note 18, at
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discouragement thwarts the goals of the student loan programs, regardless of the
borrower’s level of suffering or past repayment efforts. Thus, adding a borrowerdiscouragement criterion for consent to discharge promotes the programs’ goals
more surely than does relying on undue hardship as the only substantive ground for
such consent.
As a third example, this author also argues elsewhere that student loans that
harmed the borrower should be dischargeable because a purpose of the student loan
programs is to help borrowers, rather than simply to enable them to gamble on
education at their own risk.290 When a student has borrowed for education designed
to prepare the student for work in a specific field, the borrower’s inability to find a
solid job in that field suggests that the borrower has on net been harmed by borrowing
for education.291 Although inability to find suitable work may be a less easily
administrable criterion than the debt-to-income ratio just discussed, application for
discharge on that ground could be handled through an administrative process that
would be less burdensome than an adversary proceeding. Perhaps the IRS’s Offer in
Compromise (OIC) process could be considered as a possible model.292
Like the discouraged borrower, the borrower who has been harmed by taking out
student loans may suffer undue hardship. But a borrower may be worse off for having
incurred the loans despite being able to maintain a “minimal” standard of living while
repaying. That seems to have been the case for Audrey Eve Schatz.293 Although she
did not earn more than a de minimis amount as a lawyer294 despite applying for over
100 legal jobs after law school graduation,295 she was unable to discharge $110,000
in law school debt296 because the court found that she could pay off the loans by
selling her house.297 It seems highly likely that Audrey Schatz ended up worse off
than if she had never attended law school. Her student loans probably harmed her,
contrary to the purposes of the program.
This Section has provided three concrete examples of how the Department could
promote the purposes of the student loan programs by consenting to discharge on
grounds other than undue hardship. These examples illustrate a more general point:
Department discharge policy has been based on a standard that ignores key purposes
of the student loan programs that favor expanding dischargeability. The Department

196–205.
290. See Hunt, supra note 33, at 778–83.
291. Id.
292. For a description of the OIC process, see infra notes 333–42 and accompanying text.
293. See Schatz v. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Schatz), 584 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2018).
294. In the seven months leading up to her bankruptcy filing, Schatz earned approximately
$5300 from running her solo legal practice and helping another law firm with some house
closings, as well as approximately $7000 from performing administrative and legal work for
a nonprofit she had founded. Id. at 4.
295. Id. at 3.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 9. It appears likely that she owned the house before going to law school and
borrowing the money. The opinion does not reveal when she bought it, but she had lived in
Massachusetts since 1993, id., and did not find financial success after law school, id. at 4. It
should be noted that Schatz actually settled with the Department, so that she was seeking to
discharge only private loans. Id. at 3. Nevertheless, the case illustrates the debtor was probably
made worse off by loans despite absence of “undue hardship” in the court’s eyes.

1178

IN DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 95:1137

should liberalize its dischargeability policy in order to take account of all relevant
program goals.
C. The Department Has the Authority to Consent to Discharge Even Where
“Undue Hardship” Is Absent
Currently, the Department consents to discharge only on the grounds of undue
hardship or cost-ineffectiveness of opposing discharge.298 The Department could
make relief easier by adding grounds for consent to discharge. As just argued, the
Department should consider doing so in order to promote the overall purposes of the
student loan programs. Section III.C argues that the Department has the authority to
consent to discharge on grounds other than “undue hardship.”
Before discussing the legal grounds on which the Secretary could expand
dischargeability, it is worth considering who might challenge the Secretary’s
decision in this regard. Expanding dischargeability under the Perkins and FFEL
programs could draw a challenge because third-party holders (institutions or
guaranty agencies) may have a financial stake in the loans being discharged. It
appears that discharging otherwise collectible loans costs Perkins institutions
money.299 The situation with the FFEL program is murkier, but based on the
information available, it is at least plausible that guaranty agencies can lose money
when FFEL loans are discharged.300
For the most important program, the Ford program, it is not clear that the
Department’s decision to consent to discharge more readily would be challenged.
After all, the Ford loan creditor is the federal government, which would be making
the change. Bankrupt debtors, for their part, would be unlikely to complain about a
loosening of standards. However, perhaps loan servicers301 or private lenders who

298. See supra Section I.C.
299. It appears that lending institutions now can make use of funds collected on Perkins
loans, less the “federal share” of such funds (recall that Perkins loans are funded by a
combination of federal and institutional money). Thus, it would seem that institutional funds
are at risk in borrower bankruptcy, at least to the extent collection would occur if discharge is
denied. Press Release, Federal Student Aid, Perkins Loan Program – Federal Perkins Loan
Revolving Fund Distribution of Assets and Timelines for 2018–19 (July 11, 2018),
https://ifap.ed.gov/electronic-announcements/07-11-2018-campus-based-subject-perkins-loa
n-program-federal-perkins-loan [https://perma.cc/7GFS-AVJF] (“Institutions must return to
the Department the federal share and return to the institution the institutional share of an
institution’s Perkins Fund.”).
300. If discharge is granted, the Department pays the guaranty agency “a percentage of
the outstanding principal and interest that is equal to the complement of the reinsurance
percentage paid on the loan,” but the percentage is not clearly specified. 34 C.F.R. §
682.402(k)(5) (2019). If discharge is denied, the lender “repurchases” the loan from the
guaranty agency, but the regulations do not specify the purchase price. See id. §
682.402(j)(1)(i). It does not appear possible to determine from the regulations what guaranty
agencies’ financial incentives are in cases of borrower bankruptcy. For a fuller discussion, see
Hunt, supra note 95, at 100–01.
301. Loan servicing contracts are complex, and whether consent policy change would harm
servicers’ monetary interests is not immediately apparent. See Loan Servicing Contracts, FED.
STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/business-info/contracts/loan
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compete with the Ford program would have the desire and right302 to mount a
challenge. Moreover, the Department should act lawfully even if its action will not
be challenged. Thus, it is worthwhile to consider the legal basis for liberalizing the
student loan bankruptcy discharge rules.
1. The Secretary Enjoys Authority to Regulate Loan Programs and to Release
Claims that on Its Face Encompasses the Power to Consent to Bankruptcy
Discharge
The Secretary enjoys broad authority to make “rules and regulations” to “carry
out functions . . . vested in the Secretary”303 and “to administer and manage the
functions of the Secretary or the Department.”304 The District Court for the District
of Columbia, in holding that these provisions authorized a Department student loan
rule, recently observed that they “fashion an awfully big umbrella,”305 and that the
Higher Education Act and Title IV are a statute and a program “‘administered’ and
‘manage[d]’ by the Department.”306 In addition to these general grants of power,
Congress has specifically authorized the Secretary to “prescribe such regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes” of the FFEL program.307
Settling borrower bankruptcies is a “function” of the “Secretary” or “Department”
and therefore falls within the scope of Congress’s general delegation of rulemaking
authority. Moreover, the Secretary is specifically authorized to “compromise,”

-servicing [https://perma.cc/D7KB-98QQ] (posting federal student loan servicing contracts).
302. There could be a question whether a servicer’s or private lender’s financial interests
fall “arguably within the zone of interests” “protected or regulated” by the Bankruptcy Act
and the Higher Education Act. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 153 (1970). If not, the complaining entity would not have a cause of action. See 13A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 3531.7 (3d ed. & Supp. 2019) (“The zone-of-interests test asks
‘whether a legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses a particular plaintiff's claim.’”
(quoting Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 119 (2014))).
But see 20 U.S.C. § 1098a(a)(1) (2018) (describing “loan servicers” and “lenders” as “groups
involved in student financial assistance programs under” Title IV of the Higher Education Act,
and requiring that the Secretary “obtain the advice of and recommendations from” such groups
in issuing regulations for student-loan programs).
303. 20 U.S.C. § 1221e-3 (2018) (conferring on Secretary authority to make “rules and
regulations” “in order to carry out functions otherwise vested in the Secretary”).
304. Id. § 3474 (granting Secretary authority to make “rules and regulations” “as the
Secretary determines necessary or appropriate to administer and manage the functions of the
Secretary or the Department”).
305. Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d 176, 199 (D.D.C.
2015), aff’d, 640 F. App’x 5 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see also id. at 201 (“[F]ederal law also gives
the Department the power to ‘carry out’ programs like Title IV.”).
306. Id. at 199 (alteration in original).
307. 20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(1) (2018).
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“waive,” or “release” government claims arising under the FFEL 308 and Perkins309
programs, and to consent to modification of FFELP310 or Perkins311 loan terms. As
the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has held regarding the government’s rights
as “a surety or guarantor” under the GSL program, the Department “may by
regulation decline to enforce those rights in the larger interests of the student loan
program.”312
The discussion in Sections I.C and I.D demonstrates that the Department has long
maintained that its rulemaking power extends to regulating opposition to bankruptcy
discharge for the FFEL and Perkins programs. Although some of the Department’s
specific claims of statutory authority have been questionable,313 the just-preceding
discussion shows that the Department has been right in substance to claim this
prerogative.
For Ford loans, the Higher Education Act apparently contains no grant of
modification, compromise, or waiver authority as explicit as the grant for Perkins
and FFELP loans. However, the Court of Federal Claims has treated the FFEL grant
of power to compromise as applicable to the Ford program.314 Although the court did
not explain why it did so, one argument in favor of the court’s position is that the
Ford program incorporates the FFELP grants by reference. Ford program loans have

308. See id. § 1082(a), (a)(6) (“In the performance of . . . the functions, powers, and duties,
vested in him by this part, the Secretary may . . . (6) enforce, pay, compromise, waive, or
release any right, title, claim, lien, or demand, however acquired . . . .”).
309. See id. § 1087hh (“In carrying out the provisions of this part, the Secretary is
authorized . . . (2) to enforce, pay, compromise, waive, or release any right, title, claim, lien,
or demand, however acquired . . . .”).
310. See id. § 1082(a)(4) (“In the performance of . . . the functions, powers, and duties,
vested in him by this part, the Secretary may . . . (4) subject to the specific limitations in this
part, consent to modification, with respect to . . . any . . . provision of any note or other
instrument evidencing a loan which has been insured by the Secretary under this part.”). The
reference to loans “insured by the Secretary” may indicate that this power applies only to loans
the government insures directly, rather than to loans it insures indirectly through a reinsurance
agreement with a guaranty agency. No court appears to have addressed this potential
ambiguity.
311. See id. § 1087hh(1) (“In carrying out the provisions of this part, the Secretary is
authorized – (1) to consent to modification, with respect to . . . any . . . provision of any note
evidencing a loan which has been made under this part.”).
312. United States v. Griffin, 707 F.2d 1477, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The opinion speaks
of the powers of the “OE,” the Office of Education of the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare. That office is the predecessor to the Department.
313. In particular, the 1987 Perkins rules relied on Sections 424 and 1087cc of the
Education Code. See 1987 Perkins Rules, supra note 97, at 45,561. These provisions on their
face appear to govern provisions that must be included in contracts between the Department
and institutions, rather than the Department’s rulemaking power. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087cc
(2018); National Defense Education Act, Pub. L. No. 85-864, § 204, 72 Stat. 1583, 1584
(1958) (codified at 20 U.S.C § 424 (1964)). Moreover, as of 2019, Section 424 has been
“omitted” from the U.S. Code. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 421–25 (2018). A companion paper discusses
this issue in more detail. See Hunt, supra note 95, at 96.
314. McCain v. United States, No. 10-264C, 2011 WL 2469828, at *5 (C.F.C. June 17,
2011) (treating 20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(6) as a source of authority to compromise Federal Direct
Consolidation Loan).
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the same “terms, conditions, and benefits” as corresponding FFELP loans, 315 so if
bankruptcy discharge opposition rules are “terms, conditions, or benefits” of student
loans, the grants of power to regulate and compromise FFELP loans would probably
carry over to the Ford program.316
Apart from the incorporation-by-reference argument, it makes sense that the
government has at least as much authority to compromise or release claims when it
is the lender (as under the Ford program) as it has when other parties make the loans
(as under the Perkins and FFEL programs). Indeed, the Secretary has long claimed
the authority to decide “whether the interests of the United States are served by
refraining from collection on all or part of a defaulted loan.”317
Moreover, the fact that the Higher Education Act apparently lacks provisions
explicitly addressing most aspects of collections under the Ford program318 weakens
any negative inference that might be drawn from the absence of a specific grant
relating to modification, compromise, or waiver. Thus, the general grants of
regulatory authority to the Secretary should be understood to encompass the power
to make discharge opposition rules to promote the overall purposes of the student
loan programs.319
2. Nothing Limits the Secretary’s Authority to Consent to Situations Where
“Undue Hardship” Is Present
The Higher Education Act suggests that a broad array of considerations may enter
into setting the Department’s collection policy in general, and its bankruptcy
discharge opposition policy in particular. No provision of the Higher Education Act
appears to make collection the overriding consideration in administering student

315. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(a)(1) (2018) (“Unless otherwise specified in this part, loans made
to borrowers under this part shall have the same terms, conditions, and benefits . . . as loans
made to borrowers, and first disbursed on June 30, 2010 under sections 428 [Stafford], 428B
[PLUS], 428C [Consolidation], or 428H [Unsubsidized Stafford].”).
316. A question for prospective regulation of Ford loans under an incorporation-byreference theory is whether the statute’s provision that Ford loans have the same terms as
FFEL loans “first disbursed on June 30, 2010” precludes regulatory changes made after that
date. However, changes to FFELP regulations made today that relate to borrower discharge
opposition presumably would apply to still-outstanding FFELP loans, including those
disbursed on June 30, 2010.
317. 1985 GSL PLUS NPRM, supra note 104, at 35,966.
318. Apart from provisions authorizing the Secretary to contract with servicers, see 20
U.S.C. § 1087f(a)(1), (b)(2) (2018), to require institutions to provide information “for the
servicing and collecting” of loans, and to require defaulting borrowers to pay reasonable
collection costs, see id. § 1087e(d)(5)(A), the Higher Education Act does not appear to have
any provisions at all that address collection of Ford loans, whether out of court, through
litigation, in bankruptcy, or otherwise. The Act contains no collection directives analogous to
those discussed in the following notes for the FFEL and Perkins programs. See infra notes
321–23 and accompanying text.
319. It seems this power would encompass the authority to determine that certain situations
give rise to a rebuttable presumption of undue hardship, as scholars have suggested. See
Bruckner et al., supra note 18, at 244; Jiménez et al., supra note 16, at 115.
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loans.320 Instead, injunctions to collect in the Act are framed in terms of “reasonable
diligence,”321 “due diligence,”322 and “appropriate collection efforts.”323 These openended terms imply that the Department, in administering the student loan programs
to promote their purposes, can consent to discharge even when undue hardship is
absent.
It might be argued that Congress’s establishment of the undue-hardship standard
for student loan bankruptcies reflects a decision that discharge should be granted
only if undue hardship is present. However, the text of the grants of authority to
regulate, waive, and compromise discussed in Section III.C.1 reflects no such
limitation. Section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code, which contains the unduehardship standard,324 is not directed to the Department’s authority to make rules or
to its settlement or waiver authority. Although a purpose of section 523(a)(8) was to
restrict discharge in some respects,325 the author’s review of the legislative history of
section 523(a)(8) has not turned up any indication that the provision’s purpose was
to limit the Secretary’s power in this regard.326 Courts have looked to the overall
purposes of the student loan programs in reviewing the Secretary’s Title IV rules. 327
That suggests that a narrow focus on section 523(a)(8)’s restrictive purpose is
inappropriate.
In addition, the Department has implicitly rejected the existence of such a
limitation on its rulemaking authority for at least thirty years. At least since 1987, the
Department has assumed that it can prescribe consent to discharge on the grounds of
cost-effectiveness rather than borrower undue hardship.328 Its authority to consider

320. The Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, §§ 3601–
31, 104 Stat. 4933 (1990) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3308), and the Debt Collection
Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 31001–02, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321–358 to
1321–381 (1996) (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3701–20e), govern some aspects of student-loan
debt collection. However, neither statute mentions bankruptcy or discharge in the context of
bankruptcy.
321. See 20 U.S.C. § 1072b(d)(3)(A)–(B) (2018) (FFELP guaranty agencies); id. §
1082(h) (FFELP lenders).
322. See id. § 1087cc(a)(4) (Perkins program institutions).
323. See id. § 1087gg(b) (Perkins loans held by Secretary). The FFELP part of the
Education Code contemplates that the Secretary will try to collect but apparently does not set
standards. See id. § 1080(b) (referring to “net recovery made by the Secretary” on defaulted
loan assigned to Secretary).
324. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2018).
325. See Hunt, supra note 122, at 1310–11 (summarizing purposes of undue-hardship
provision).
326. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595 (1977); S. REP. NO. 94-482 (1976); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1232
(1976); H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137 (1973) (report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of
the United States); 124 CONG. REC. 1791–98 (1978); 122 CONG. REC. 27,977 (1976).
327. Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d 176, 199 (D.D.C.
2015), aff’d, 640 F. App’x 5 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (upholding rule in part because it “advance[d]
the purposes of . . . the Higher Education Act and Title IV”).
328. See 1987 Perkins Rules, supra note 97, at 45,560 (codified at 34 C.F.R.
§ 674.49(c)(4)–(5)) (adopting provision that institution “shall oppose” discharge if undue
hardship was absent and expected cost of litigation fell below one-third of amount owed).
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this nonhardship ground apparently has never been questioned,329 and the
Department’s longstanding, consistent position on the matter is itself a ground for
deference.330 Thus, it seems established that one big-picture statutory goal—that of
wisely husbanding resources—justifies consenting to discharge when undue
hardship is absent. It is therefore difficult to argue that other such goals—those of
promoting access, freedom of choice, and education, and of benefiting students—
should be excluded.331
3. Other Federal Agencies Have Adopted Nonhardship-Based Programs for
Compromise of Claims
Both the IRS and the Department of Justice have developed programs to
compromise or release federal claims. These programs apparently are based on
general grants of authority and the materials describing them do not cite statutory
authorization for the particular grounds for compromise or release they adopt.332 This
suggests that the Department’s grants of authority create an overall discretionary
power to consent to discharge on grounds of the Department’s devising, as long as
doing so promotes the purposes of the student loan programs.
The Internal Revenue Service operates an Offer in Compromise (OIC) program.
An OIC, in the words of the IRS, “allows you to settle your tax debt for less than the
full amount you owe.”333 The Secretary of the Treasury can compromise a claim on

329. Indeed, the theory that Congress intended undue hardship to be the only ground for
both nonconsensual and consensual discharge could foreclose even the Department’s
independent evaluation of undue hardship. If, for example, deterrence of meritless petitions is
important enough, then the Department arguably should not give up the chance to convince
the bankruptcy court that undue hardship is absent, even if the Department’s view is otherwise.
330. See, e.g., Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 487 (2004) (“We
‘normally accord particular deference to an agency interpretation of “longstanding”
duration.’” (quoting Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 220 (2002))); see also Anita S.
Krishnakumar, Longstanding Agency Interpretations, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1823, 1825 (2015)
(“In principle, virtually everyone seems to agree that longstanding agency statutory
interpretations should be entitled to extra weight upon judicial review.”).
331. See supra Section III.B.1.
332. Although immigration law enforcement is farther afield than other debt-collection
regimes, it provides an example of an agency forbearing, without express statutory
authorization, from pursuing individuals. The immigration authorities have, since before 1975,
exercised “prosecutorial discretion” to decline to pursue removal in some instances. See Shoba
Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 CONN. PUB.
INT. L.J. 243, 246 (2010). Justice Scalia described one such exercise of discretion, “deferred
action,” as adopted “for humanitarian reasons, or simply for [the agency’s] own convenience”
and as a “commendable exercise in administrative discretion, developed without express
statutory authorization.” Reno v. Am. Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 484–
85 (1999) (quoting 6 C. GORDON, S. MAILMAN & S. YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 72.03(2)(h) (1998)); see also Recommendation from Prakash Khatri,
Ombudsman, CIS, to Dr. Emilio T. Gonzalez, Director, CIS, at 1 (April 6, 2007) (“There is
no statutory basis for deferred action, but the regulations reference this form of relief . . . .”).
333. Offer in Compromise, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Jan. 3, 2020),
https://www.irs.gov/payments/offer-in-compromise [https://perma.cc/5J3H-SNCU].
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any of several bases set forth in regulations.334 The OIC rules recognize nonhardship
bases for compromising federal claims even though hardship is the only specific
statutory criterion for compromise.
The only specific statutory criteria for OICs are hardship-related: an OIC should
leave the taxpayer “an adequate means to provide basic living expenses” 335 and the
Secretary of the Treasury may not reject an OIC from a low-income taxpayer solely
because of the amount of the offer.336 Nevertheless, the OIC regulations provide for
acceptance of OICs on grounds other than hardship, such as that compromise would
“promote effective tax administration” where, due to “public policy and equity
considerations,” “collection of the full [tax] liability would undermine public
confidence that the tax laws are being administered in a fair and equitable manner.”337
In promulgating the OIC regulations, the Secretary did not claim that all the grounds
for compromise had an explicit statutory basis, instead citing “[t]he legislative
history accompanying” the provision on which it relied.338
The OIC program differs from what this Article advocates for student loan
bankruptcy in that the IRS will not accept OICs of zero. This, however, is due to an
express statutory requirement of partial payment that apparently has no analog in
student loan law.339 Moreover, the IRS reportedly will accept nominal settlement
offers when warranted.340 The OIC statute also expressly authorizes the Secretary of
the Treasury to “prescribe guidelines for officers and employees of the Internal
Revenue Service to determine whether an offer-in-compromise is adequate and
should be accepted to resolve a dispute.”341 This provision arguably distinguishes the
OIC program at least from compromise under the Ford program, where the Secretary
is not specifically authorized to compromise claims under that particular program.
However, the Secretary’s overall authority to compromise Ford claims by consenting
to partial or full discharge does not seem to be in dispute.342

334. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.7122-1(a)(1) (2019) (providing for compromise “[i]f the
Secretary determines that there are grounds for compromise under this section”).
335. See 26 U.S.C. § 7122(d)(2)(A) (2018).
336. Id. § 7122(d)(3)(A). The Secretary of the Treasury cited both section 7122 and section
7805 as authority for the OIC regulations. See Compromise of Tax Liabilities, 67 Fed. Reg.
48,025, 48,026, 48,029 (July 23, 2002) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301). Section 7805 empowers
the Secretary of the Treasury to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement
of this title,” which does not mention compromise of tax liability at all, much less establish
substantive standards for compromise. Id.
337. 26 C.F.R. § 301.7122-1(b)(3)(ii) (2019).
338. Compromise of Tax Liabilities, 67 Fed. Reg. at 48,026 (“The legislative history
accompanying [the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998] explains
that Congress intended that, in certain circumstances, factors such as equity, hardship, and
public policy be taken into account by the IRS in evaluating whether the compromise of
individual tax liabilities would promote effective tax administration.”).
339. See 26 U.S.C. § 7122(c)(1) (2018) (requiring that partial payment accompany offer in
compromise).
340. See W. Edward Afield, Compromising Student Loans, 69 S.C. L. REV. 81, 104–05
(2017). Professor Afield argues that the OIC program can be a model for improving the various
income-driven repayment programs available for student loans. See id. at 84–86.
341. See 26 U.S.C. § 7122(d)(1) (2018).
342. See Limkemann v. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Limkemann), 314 B.R. 190, 192 (Bankr.
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The Department of Justice also maintains nonhardship-based standards for
settlement of certain claims of the United States,343 including claims against bankrupt
debtors.344 The Justice Manual provides that United States Attorneys can settle
certain claims of the United States on any of nine bases, including that compromise
is “necessary to prevent injustice”345 or is “in the interests of the United States.”346
The Manual cites no specific statutory authority for these bases for settlement.
4. The Department Can Add Bases for Dischargeability Under the Ford Program
Without Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking
Section III.C has argued so far that the Department can consent to discharge on
bases other than the ones it currently recognizes, undue hardship and cost
ineffectiveness of opposing discharge. Section III.C.4 argues that, at least for the
Ford program, the Department can add such new grounds for consent to discharge
without going through notice-and-comment rulemaking.
As noted, the Department has the power to make “rules” to “carry out,”
“administer,” and “manage” its functions,347 and these functions include collecting
debts and compromising claims.348 Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
“rules” include not only “legislative” rules, which must be adopted through notice
and comment, but also “interpretative rules,”349 and “rules of agency, organization,
procedure, or practice.”350 Rules in the latter two categories may be adopted without
notice and comment.351
In addition, the Secretary has “responsibility for the development and
promulgation of policy . . . relating to” the federal student loan programs.352 The

N.D. Iowa 2004) (noting that debtor and Department of Education reached a tentative
settlement agreement while debtor’s adversary proceeding was pending). The Department
argued against discharge on the ground that the debtor was eligible for IDR “offered by the
William D. Ford Program.” Id. It appears likely that this was a case in which the Department
offered to compromise a Ford loan while bankruptcy was pending.
343. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL loc. 4-3.100 to 4-3.432 (2018).
344. Id. loc. 4-3.220 (“Claims in Conjunction with Bankruptcy Code Proceedings . . . . The
same limitations and standards as described in JM 4-3.200 govern compromises under the
Bankruptcy Code.”).
345. Id. loc. 4-3.200F.
346. Id. loc. 4-3.200I. This determination is to be made “in light of [the U.S. Attorney’s]
assessment of the litigation risk and the amounts involved in the event of full, partial, or no
success.” Id. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the Attorney General’s status as the litigator rather
than the client, the guidelines provide, “Hardship, which does not involve inability to pay, is
not a proper basis for settlement.” Id. loc. 4-3.200D.4; see Devins & Herz, supra note 206, at
562 (in government civil actions, “DOJ will not proceed without a client”).
347. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1221e-3, 3474 (2018).
348. See supra Section III.C.1.
349. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2018).
350. See id.
351. See id. § 553(b)(3).
352. 20 U.S.C. § 1018(b)(1) (2018). The statute references “programs of student financial
assistance under subchapter IV.” Id. That is the portion of the Code that governs the federal
student-loan programs.
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APA exempts “general statements of policy” from its general requirement of noticeand-comment rulemaking.353
Thus, the Department does not have to engage in notice and comment if it issues
a general statement of policy, interpretive rule,354 or rule of agency practice
announcing that it will consent to discharge on grounds other than undue hardship.
The Department has already issued just such a document: the 2015 Dear Colleague
Letter. As regards the Ford program, the letter is a policy statement or rule of practice
that states that the Department will consent to discharge on the ground of costeffectiveness355—that is, a ground other than undue hardship.
The 2015 Dear Colleague Letter appears to be a general statement of policy. As
defined in the 1947 Attorney General’s Manual, adopted a year after enactment of
the APA, general statements of policy “advise the public prospectively of the manner
in which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power.”356 Given that the
HEA does not address collections in borrower bankruptcy at all,357 it seems difficult
to describe the Department’s decision whether to oppose discharge in a Fordprogram borrower’s bankruptcy as anything other than “discretionary.”
The 2015 Dear Colleague Letter appears to “advise the public prospectively” of
how the Department intends to exercise its discretionary power to consent to
discharge. With regard to Ford program loans, the 2015 Dear Colleague Letter sets
forth the analysis the Department currently performs “when evaluating whether to
consent or not object” to a debtor’s discharge petition.358
Although the line between a statement of policy and a legislative rule can be
difficult to draw in some instances, the case here does not seem to be all that close.
As Professor Keith Werhan has observed, courts often distinguish between
legislative rules and policy statements by looking to whether the pronouncement in
question binds the agency.359 The agency commits to following rules, but when
issuing a policy statement, it “retains the discretion and authority to change its
position—even abruptly—in any specific case.”360 The letter sets forth the
Department’s current policy and does not purport to bind the Department or any other
party.
Insofar as the letter is understood as instructing Department employees how to
perform their functions, it may be a “rule[] of agency . . . practice.”361 As noted,

353. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2018).
354. Despite the APA’s use of the word “interpretative,” this Article uses the term
“interpretive,” which seems to be more common in current discussion. See, e.g., Azar v. Allina
Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1807 (2019).
355. See 2015 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 22, at 1, 3–4 (noting that for Ford loans
the Department follows the same “two-step analysis” as for non-Ford student loans, and that
only first step in analysis involves evaluation of undue hardship; second step involves
determining cost-effectiveness of opposing discharge).
356. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 30 n.3 (1947).
357. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070–99d (2018).
358. 2015 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 22, at 1.
359. See KEITH WERHAN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 284 (3d ed. 2019).
360. Syncor Int’l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
361. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2018).
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notice and comment is not required for such rules.362 Whether characterized as a
statement of policy or a rule of practice, the 2015 Dear Colleague Letter properly
was issued without notice and comment. It is an on-point precedent for the
proposition that the Department can decide to consent to discharge on grounds other
than undue hardship without notice and comment.
Further evidence of the authority to take such action without notice and comment
comes from other agencies. They likewise handle decisions about bankruptcy and
collection matters through documents apparently adopted without notice-andcomment rulemaking. The Internal Revenue Manual supplies directions to IRS
employees for consenting to Chapter 11363 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy plans,364 as
well as policies relating to the OIC program previously discussed.365 The manual
apparently was not issued through notice-and-comment procedures.366 The Justice
Manual, which as discussed provides guidance for when the United States will
compromise claims in litigation,367 also does not appear to have been adopted
through notice and comment.368 It seems that the Department can, following the
example of other agencies in federal debt collection and its own precedent in the
2015 Dear Colleague Letter, expand its dischargeability criteria for the Ford program
without notice and comment.
Action without notice and comment is more difficult for the other two programs.
As previously explained, the Perkins program regulations require holders to oppose
discharge whenever undue hardship is absent and collection costs are expected to be
less than one-third of the loan balance.369 This requirement seems to leave no room
for adding more grounds for consent discharge, and changing it would seem to
require notice-and-comment rulemaking.
The FFEL program has no similar barrier in its regulations, but the Department
faces the issue that adding grounds for consent to discharge would regulate the
conduct of third parties, namely guaranty agencies,370 rather than merely stating
policies and procedures governing its own conduct as would be the case in acting on
Ford program loans. Although the Department could issue an interpretive rule
without notice and comment,371 such rules must “interpret[] ‘existing law’” rather

362. See id.. As regards the FFEL and Perkins programs, the letter can be understood as
interpreting the Department’s existing regulations, and thus may be an interpretive rule. Such
rules also can be issued without notice and comment. See id.
363. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL loc. 5.9.8.14.2.
(2019).
364. See, e.g., id. loc. 5.9.10.5
365. See, e.g., id. loc. 5.8.5.
366. See id. loc. 1.11.2 (describing process for making changes to Internal Revenue
Manual; process described does not include notice and comment).
367. See supra Section III.C.3.
368. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 343, loc. 1-1.300 (describing process for
changes to Justice Manual; process described does not include notice and comment).
369. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
370. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(i)(1) (2019) (instructing guaranty agencies on consent to
discharge).
371. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2018) (providing exception to notice-and-comment
requirement for “interpretative” rules).
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than “mak[e] ‘new law.’”372 This distinction has been criticized and may often be
difficult to apply.373 However, given the policy discretion involved in crafting new
grounds for consent to discharge, it may be difficult to characterize the adoption of
such grounds as simply “interpreting” statutory commands—even though doing so
would advance statutory purpose.374 Creating new grounds for consent to discharge
would seem instead to be an exercise of legislative rulemaking power, requiring
notice and comment.375 Acting through notice and comment to adopt the new rules
for the FFEL program would be consistent with the Department’s practices to date.376
5. The Department Should Consider Adding Grounds for Consent to Discharge
Through Guidance First, Following up with Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking
Assuming the Department can dispense with notice and comment in adopting
additional bases for consent to discharge, at least for the Ford program, should it do
so? As discussed in the context of fixing gaps and ambiguities in the regulations, one
reason not to engage in notice and comment is the time and expense the process
consumes.377 Here, where the change is of greater significance, administrative
convenience in adopting it has less relative weight. However, given the scale of the
problem,378 quick relief for borrowers is important.
A second reason for issuing guidance rather than notice and comment is to insulate
agency action from judicial review.379 This motive is of questionable legitimacy.
A third reason for simply issuing a new policy statement rather than pursuing
notice-and-comment rulemaking is that the former approach preserves flexibility.
Guidance documents such as policy statements can be amended without going
through notice and comment.380 Such flexibility could have its advantages. For

372. See Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1987
DUKE L.J. 381, 394.
373. See Ronald M. Levin, Rulemaking and the Guidance Exemption, 70 ADMIN. L. REV.
263, 317–18 (2018) (collecting and endorsing critiques of the definition of an interpretive
rule).
374. Instead of announcing new grounds for consent to discharge, the Department
potentially could liberalize its dischargeability policy for the Perkins and FFEL programs by
reinterpreting the term “undue hardship” on those programs’ regulations. Issuing such an
“interpretive rule” would not require notice and comment. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2018).
As discussed, given the Department’s position that “undue hardship” in its regulations means
the same as “undue hardship” in section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Department’s
authority to interpret the phrase authoritatively is in doubt. See supra Section II.B.3.
375. See Seidenfeld, supra note 153, at 336 (“[L]egislative rulemaking requires notice and
comment.”).
376. See supra Section I.D.
377. See supra Section II.B.2.
378. As noted, one estimate of the number of borrowers each year who should apply for
student-loan discharge and do not is 69,000. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
379. For the potential effectiveness of acting through guidance in shielding agency action
from judicial review, see supra note 153 and accompanying text.
380. See 1 KOCH & MURPHY, supra note 150, § 4:60 (“Since guidance documents may be
adopted without notice and comment procedures, they may be amended or repealed . . . without
notice and comment procedures.”). A district court recently held that a Dear Colleague letter
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example, the Department arguably should be able to react quickly to any uptick in
apparent strategic default behavior after the Department liberalizes its discharge
policy.
In support of notice-and-comment rulemaking, the Department may engage with
the public’s views more robustly if it presents a specific proposal, receives comment,
and responds to the comments it receives.381 The requirement that the Department
negotiate with stakeholders before starting notice-and-comment rulemaking for
student loans may further enhance interested parties’ participation.382 In addition,
notice-and-comment rulemaking produces more reliable rules from the borrower’s
perspective precisely because the rules cannot be so easily changed.383
Perhaps the best resolution is a sort of compromise. The Department could
promptly issue guidance that implements as much of the desired policy liberalization
as can be adopted without notice-and-comment rulemaking. After an interval to
evaluate whether the new policy is working, the Department could engage in notice
and comment to get a broad array of perspectives on the new policy’s effectiveness
and, if desired, make the policy permanent. This approach provides quick relief to
borrowers, preserves flexibility to react to unintended consequences, then takes input

from the Department governing a student loan program could, depending on the facts, be a
“new rule,” requiring the Department to acknowledge the change and explain its position.
USA Funds v. King, 200 F. Supp. 3d 163, 166–67, 172 (D.D.C. 2016). However, there is no
suggestion in the opinion that the Department was required to engage in notice-and-comment
rulemaking. See id.
381. See, e.g., Francesca E. Bignami, The Democratic Deficit in European Community
Rulemaking: A Call for Notice and Comment Rulemaking in Comitology, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J.
451, 499 (1999) (“Notice and comment rulemaking guarantees pluralist interest participation
in rulemaking.”). But see Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification
Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950-1990, 80
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1425 n.50 (2012) (collecting citations questioning whether noticeand-comment rulemaking brings about participation).
382. See 20 U.S.C. § 1098a(b)(1) (2018) (“Participants in the negotiations process shall be
chosen by the Secretary from individuals nominated by groups described in subsection
(a)(1).”); id. § 1098a(a)(1) (listing “groups involved in student financial assistance programs
under this subchapter”).
383. Notice-and-comment rulemaking would also produce longer-term reliability for thirdparty holders such as guaranty agencies and higher education institutions. Admittedly, it is not
totally clear long-term reliability is desirable here. Chapter 7 bankruptcies typically are
completed relatively quickly. See Chapter 7 - Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-7bankruptcy-basics [https://perma.cc/AE6C-ABXC] (reporting that Chapter 7 discharge is
usually granted in 60 to 90 days from filing unless a party objects to discharge or moves to
extend the time to object to discharge). Thus, a student-loan borrower who is already in
financial distress and contemplating Chapter 7 has a relatively short time horizon and is
unlikely to develop a reliance interest in particular rules that is then frustrated if the rules are
changed. By contrast, a borrower who wants long-term certainty about bankruptcy policy may
be a would-be strategic defaulter, taking out loans that the borrower intends to discharge. On
the other hand, reliability benefits good-faith planners as well as strategic defaulters. Some
presumably recognize that educational investments do not always pan out and want to make
an informed decision about them.
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from all interested stakeholders and ultimately provides borrowers with reliable
rules.
CONCLUSION
Historically, the Department’s bankruptcy discharge opposition rules have missed
the opportunity to alleviate the procedural barriers and substantive unpredictability
facing student loan borrowers contemplating bankruptcy. In addition, the regulations
reflect relatively little analysis, contain ambiguities and large gaps, and have been
aimed narrowly at protecting the federal government’s pecuniary interests at the
expense of other purposes of the student loan programs. A thoughtful process that
refines the bankruptcy discharge opposition rules in light of the overall purpose of
the student loan programs is likely to improve the quality of the rules, honor
Congressional intent, and help struggling student loan borrowers through more
predictable and generous consent to discharge.

